Mapping the body: major conceptions of human embodiment from the West by Ayaş, Ahmet Murat
- ^ - ,  ,.φ\ >т
,-rté.·· -ψ^.· .
’^:,'r  ^ Г' ■’■ 'Ύ t— ■“ ‘
«>4a?
Mapping the Body:
Major Conceptions of Human Embodiment
from the West
A THESIS 
SUBMITTED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF GRAPHIC DESIGN
AND
THE INSTITUTE OF FINE ARTS OF 
BiLKENT UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF FINE ARTS
by
Ahmet Murat Ayaş 
May, 1998______ _
0
ts3
i^fm
I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully 
adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of 
Fine Arts.
Assist.Prof.Dr. Mahmut Mutman (Supervisor)
I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully 
adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of 
Fine Arts.
I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully 
adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of 
Fine Arts.
Approved by the Institute of Fine Arts
Prof.Dr. Bülent Özgüç 
Director of the Institute of Fine Arts
ABSTRACT
Mapping the Body:
Major Conceptions of Human Embodiment 
from the West
Ahmet Murat Ayaş 
M.F.A. in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Assist.Prof.Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
May, 1998
Within the humanistic and social sciences of western world, the human body, the 
state of being embodied, and the indelible interrelatedness of mind and the body 
have long been neglected in favour of the mind that is supposedly self-contained. 
The major reasons for that are claimed to be the philosophy of Cartesianism and 
mainstream Structuralism that foster the hegemony of dichotomous thought, which 
asserts that mind and the body are clearly distinct. Deconstructionist tools, however, 
have showed the impossibility of such an unequivocal distinction as well as pure 
totality and isolated presence. The main theme of this study is to map the major 
western conceptions that either implicitly or explicitly have developed notions of the 
body and embodiment which are in various fashions away from the constraints which 
have opposed the body to mind or which have considered the body as closed, 
universal, nonhistorical biological entity. The notions that are developed in that way 
have the capacity to show that the body, as much as the psyche and the subject, is 
both cultural and historical product bearing peculiar natural qualities that position it 
as both an object and subject with powers of being affected and to affect the others. 
The study concludes with a discussion on the significance and importance of the 
need to develop an adequate understanding of the body that eventually would enrich 
the ethical and political actions as well as the approach to art, design and architecture.
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ÖZET
Bedenin Haritasını çıkarmak: 
tnsan Bedenselliği Üzerine Batıdan Başlıca Görüşler
Ahmet Murat Ayaş 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard.Doç.Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Mayıs, 1998
Batının insan ve sosyal bilimlerinin gelişiminden bu yana beden, bedenselliğin 
nitelikleri ve akıl ile bedenin ayrılmaz ve gerekli ilişkisi güya-kendine-yeterli-aklı tek 
yanlı olarak öne çıkaracak şekilde ihmal edilegelmiştir. Bu durumun, akıl ve bedenin 
kesin ve temiz ayrımını iddia eden ikili karşıtlıklar düşüncesinin egemenlik 
oluşturmasına önayak olan Kartezyenizm ve Yapısalcılık felsefesinden kaynaklandığı 
öne sürülmektedir. Parçala(n)ma düşüncesi ise böylesine tartışılmaz bir ayrımın, aynen 
saf bütünlük ve yalıtılmış mevcudiyet gibi, mümkün olamayacağını göstermiştir. Bu 
çalışmanın ana konusu, batının bu kısıtlamalardan uzaklaşarak akıl ile bedenin 
karşıtlığına ve bedenin salt kapalı, evrensel, ve tarihselliksiz bir biyolojik varlık olduğu 
görüşüne aykırı olarak gelişen başlıca görüşlerinin haritasını çıkarmaktır. Bu yönde 
gelişen görüşlerde bedenin, tıpkı ruh ve özne gibi, özellikli doğal nitelikleri ile hem 
nesne ve hem de özne olarak tesir etme ve edilme kudretine sahip bir kültürel ve 
tarihsel sonuç olduğu fikri bir gizilgüç olarak bulunmaktadır. Çalışmanın sonuç 
bölümünde beden hakkında uygun bir anlayışın geliştirilmesine olan gereksinimin 
önemi ve manası tartışılarak bu anlayışın nihayetinde sanat, tasarım ve mimarlıkta 
olduğu kadar etik ve politik hareketlerdeki olası zenginleştiriciliği de ima edilmiştir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Beden, Bedensellik, İkili karşıtlıklar, Parçala(n)ma 
(Dekonstrüksiyon), Batı Felsefesi.
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Introduction
The body is the keyword, on which a variety of most stimulating, heated 
debates hinge; yet at the same time, which, astonishing as it may be, is still the bearer 
of the most obliviously taken for granted “constituent” of human being in certain 
fields of knowledges. The body, in the first instance, may seem to imply an 
undeniable, genuine, trustworthy “reality” (be it a conceptual or physical one) which 
has concerted unity, entirety, wholeness, and oneness. However, as the expanding 
debates on it demonstrate, and as the rigorous studies on the body claim, this is an 
illusory “reality”; there is neither a totality nor a harmony pertaining to the 
conception, and the physical or psychical peculiarities of the body. It is an enigmatic, 
puzzling, elaborate compound that never ceases moving, doing, and becoming. It is 
slippery as much as it is concrete. It is among the most complex, complicated, 
multifaceted “subject matters” of any institutionalized discipline or any cultural-social 
discourse, that the further the “inquiries” on it, the more indeterminable, indefinable, 
unknown, and even, the more unfamiliar, obscure, mysterious the body is to “us”*.
* Bryan Turner, being one of the most productive and among the earliest scholars that has 
written and drawn attention on various aspects of the human embodiment, body-image, and 
the body since the 1980s, “admits” in the introduction of his latest publication that “In
The body, when taken as a keyword can lead one to extensive quantity of 
theoretical and practical works and researches which have been conducted within a 
variety of disciplines. Regardless of whether these disciplines may fall under the 
domain of natural/positive sciences (medicine, biology, psychology, biochemistry, 
etc.), or humanistic/social sciences (philosophy, sociology, anthropology, geography, 
history, etc.), one common point that is noticed immediately and inevitably is the 
diversity o f  the conceptions in respect to the body. This is regarded as a natural 
consequence of the distinction of the knowledges into specific, defined, and distinct areas 
that emerged after the Enlightenment and crystallized after nineteenth century. 
Thereupon, in most of the recent works focused on various aspects of the body, the 
production of fragmentary knowledges on the body as such is generally criticized for 
being an impediment to a more comprehensive and richer understanding of the body 
in its full compkxity (Elliott 1992, Shilling 1993, Falk 1994, Grosz 1994, 1995, Pile and 
Thrift 1995, Pile 1996, Gatens 1996, Turner 1992, 1994, 1996).
The diversity and variety in the construction of the conceptions, approaches, 
frameworks, boundaries, and priorities —in short, any methodological and contextual 
determinant that one can think of- those of the works even within the same 
discipline is striking. This diversity is particularly noteworthy considering the studies 
that are related to the body of the “established fields of knowledges” (the disciplines) 
that fall under the realm of humanities and social sciences.
writing this study on the body, I have become increasingly less sure of what the body is’ 
(1996: 42).
However, it would not be fair to claim that this is true solely in this peculiar 
subject matter, i.e. the body. There are other closely related and intensively used 
“keywords” or “concepts” adhered to the body, which exhibit the very same fate of 
being the source of diverse offshoots, and being subjected to varied approaches. 
Most remarkable of them are self, person, subject(ivity), representation, and identity. 
Then comes a set of contexts; space, time, sex, gender, technology, difference, and 
alike, which are somehow at one point, always connected with the body, embodiment, 
and (situated) corporeality.
The fuzziness of the boundaries, and merging of the problem fields of the 
social sciences are generally considered as a consequence of the pluralistic view of 
(post)modernity. In accordance to that, notably since the 1980s there have emerged 
an increasing number of new fields of knowledge that are self-appointed and self­
ruling with self-formulated problems rather than being an annex to the territory of 
the institutionalised disciplines. Cultural studies, feminist studies, queer studies, 
gender studies, women studies, media studies, contemporary studies, and alike can be 
claimed to be of this kind, which have definitely gained greater acceleration with tlie 
thrust of the twentieth century philosophy and its epidemic, yet mostly implicit, 
ramifications. It is, in these studies, which are mainly concerned with the 
contemporary culture and the problematic fields within it, that we encounter, most 
explicitly and boldly, with the questions of the body. Body piercing, gym, rave 
dancing, fashion, health food, etc. as the signs of the acknowledgment of the body in 
popular culture are examined in these studies which are always contextual (Grossberg 
et al. 1992; 1-22). I will refer to the impact of these studies in chapter one, but will 
not follow their contextual approach, as this study’s approach is from a more general
and philosophical view. Yet, in terms of methodology, it is somewhat similar to that 
of cultural studies; it is “alchemistical”.
Scope, Objective, and Ethics
Within the given context and boundaries of this work (spatial-temporal and 
practical-theoretical), the scope and objective have been restricted to a portion of 
what I have intended initially. However, apart from the mentioned boundaries, the 
primary factor that has limited my appetite, has stemmed from the unanticipated 
vastness, vagueness and multi-facettedness of the subject matter. Initially I attempted 
to work on the body, as it is situated in urban space and experiencing sequence of 
spaces and connections at various dimensions and levels within the city. However, as 
the theories and critiques of the conceptions on the body have gaps and unexplored 
territories in its relatively short history, the grounds that a study can be founded on is 
remarkably slippery. Therefore, as I gradually understand it, any study that takes the 
body in a specific context requires a conscientious work solely on the body before 
going beyond it.
An attempt to accomplish a theoretical study on the human body, 
embodiment and/or situatedness of the corporeality is not an easy task: even if it is 
anthological as this work tries to be one. The task of theorizing the body has peculiar 
complications that are emanated from the historical and philosophical inadequacies. 
Such a task would bring along its paradoxical, hermetic nodes, and black holes as one 
would carry it forward and carry it through, and it certainly would be full of hardship.
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The complexity of the human body, in addition to its omni-presence and/or omni­
absence (or perhaps absent presence) in the theoretical and practical fields of 
established knowledges, which has significant inadequacies, has forced me to make 
decisions, or precisely more passively, make choices in the beginning of the study.
The first choice is made on the “tyP^” body that will be studied as
being the basic determinant of the scope. The “type” of the human body in this 
study will, inevitably, be taken in its “most contemporary-basic”, yet broadest form. 
The body I envisage, and I believe it can be broadly defined, is a body “o f ’ a 
“modern”, self-reflexive “subject” that lives in a capitalist-consumer-communication- 
technological environment. None the less, this is definitely not for the sake of 
advocating any form of essentialist, reductionist stance, nor to defy the possibility of 
the multiplicity of the bodies, but for the sake of practicality. The peculiarities of the 
“other types of bodies”; those of men, women, queer, white, black, brown, teenager, 
elder, urban, rural, anti-capitalist, anti-consuming, pathological and so on, were not 
denied. However, it is accepted as all the “types of tlie bodies” are having common 
natural and socio-cultural aspects, at least at a certain period of their lives. I am aware 
that this assumption may inhere, unpreventably, a series of intrinsic/inscribed 
presumptions, or may not avoid the possibility of the body that is studied becomes 
the body that may bear some discrete qualities (those of man’s body, or white-man’s, 
or capitalist-white-man’s, and so on). The study is not historical as well, although 
some of the accounts on the body that I refer have been assumed to take their places 
in history e.g., Spinoza, Nietzsche. As being a novice to the “subject matter”, which 
itself is in fact considered as “untouched”, this awareness triggered the second 
inevitable choice.
Second choice has resulted or rather crystallized in the “field of knowledge” 
that is employed in the study, which will shape the theoretical framework and the 
objective. In the first instance, the subject matter, adhered to the notions mentioned 
above, implies that it should be better studied within the realm of social sciences, 
particularly anthropology and/or sociology. Yet, such a choice requires a more or less 
defined context that brings along additional concepts and limitations within its 
discourse which this study can not cover due to its limitations. Since I strive to 
explore the conceptions of the human body in a scope as broad as possible in the 
first place, I have come to an understanding that it requires employing philosophical 
tools and models. I believe for a study as such, philosophical tools would supply the 
most appropriate and effective method. Therefore, to conduct a research on the 
significance and role of the body in relation to self, to society, and to culture, in an 
anthological approach that comprises the major and most influential philosophical 
conceptions of the body is the objective of this study. The nature of this research is 
not that of a comparative sort, although in certain points some comparisons are 
made. Only the philosophical conceptions of the west are studied witliin a 
methodology that is described in the next subsection.
Although the format of the text closely follows the MLA handbook, there 
are deviations from the restrictions posed by it: the use of language, punctuation, and 
mechanics of writing in a personal style is unavoidable, which hopefully would not be 
disruptive. In order to avoid sexism, the feminine pronoun is used instead of 
masculine pronoun, sometimes the pronoun “it” is used for substituting “the 
subject”, “human being”, “the body”. Words or word groups are italicized when a 
particular need for accentuation is aroused. Double inverted commas, apart from the 
ones used for incorporated quotations, are used for emphasizing a certain meaning of
the word as well as a certain shift in the meaning. Footnotes are generally used for 
two purposes; i) in order to convey additional information that is not necessarily to 
be incorporated with the main text, or to draw attention and to guide the reader to a 
connection and affinity with another source and idea, ii) In a more personal manner, 
in order to comment on the offshoots that the idea or concept at that specific point 
has evoked.
Methodological Framework
what distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely 
oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The 
map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it 
constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, 
the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum 
opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is 
itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all 
of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant 
modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of 
mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation.
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 12)
Yet, still, mapping the human body and all the adherent notions to it (such as 
corporeality, subject, self, person, identity) is not easy. The difficulty arises from the 
fact that the body neither does have precise boundaries, nor stable form and position 
through time and space. The body is literally and culturally moving, changing. It is 
transforming and it transforms since it is both the agency and active part of the 
structure. The body acts and performs, it establish linkages, connections in time and 
space, when it is located or moving, it always and already encountering, feeling, being, 
and doing.
However, mapping has certain qualities that are relatively more appropriate in 
comparison to tracing of or giving definitions to the body. In contra to the 
Enlightenment idea that assumes everything can be surveyed and pinned down, in 
mapping, if taken as a wayfmding, the unclear boundaries and changing relations and 
connections of the body can be considered as ever-occuring, and thus no specific 
objective should be anticipated that is aimed for fixed definitions, but for possibilities. 
Mapping as an activity requires one to cover certain positions that constitute the field 
rather than looking down at it from a transcendental position high in the sky.
A map, as Deleuze and Guattari says, is “an experimentation in contact with 
the real”, and this study should be considered as such as well. Despite the 
anthological nature it bears, which is more apparent through the first three chapters, 
it is always possible to detect the attempts of experimentation (which sometimes are 
made quite idiosyncratically) throughout the study, and particularly in the 
“conclusion” chapter. In such a spirit and tone, the study tries to demonstrate the 
“landmarks” within the territory. It does not intend to show everything, but what the 
cartographer has seen during his travel and has chosen to show. There can be always 
different maps that (when read as separate layers) may show various qualities and 
quantities of the territory. Maps also may vary through time. Yet, all these maps can 
be read as not being opposed to each other but as transparent layers that can be 
complementary when put on each otlier, they then constitute an “atlas”. 
Nevertheless, I am not claiming to be an “Atlas” that bears the whole range of
questions regarding the body for the time being . My map, hopefully, will be one of 
my personal major maps within the atlas of the body that I am intended to gather up 
in tlie future.
A map of a territory may show discrete and apparent geographical 
topographies (cf psychical topographies of Freud and Lacan), another one may be 
for social-political-administrative boundaries that show the distribution and effects of 
power (cf. works of Nietzsche and Foucault), another one may be for underground 
resources, caves, and movement of underground rivers and their connections (cf. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Body). A map, it must be noted, by definition, can not cover 
and convey everything, and certainly can not represent fully the “real territory” in its 
plenitude and complexity. Nevertheless, it can always be used as a guide before and 
during a journey, and as a source that helps one to “imagine” that territory. To claim 
otherwise, as in Borges’s story, leads one to a paradoxical mapping that eventually 
produces a map that would be one-to-one scale.
A map may show the qualities of territories, connections and relations 
between the regions, areas, fields, in terms of proximity, affinity and gap. It, more 
importantly, implies circumstances and possibilities. In accordance to that, my 
question is not, “what is the body?”, as the body as a “sign” or “trace” have escaped 
and will always escape that question (see Derrida Deconstructing) .
 ^ Atlas (not adas) is a Titan, condemned by Zeus to support the sky on his shoulders, a 
person who supports a heavy burden; mainstay.
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Derrida says, “the sign is that ill-named thing, the only one that escapes the instituting 
question of philosophy: ‘what is . . .?’ ” (1976: 19).
I am, now, intending to embark a journey in order to draw this initial map 
that will guide me to find my way by drawing attention to landmarks, circumstances 
and possibilities. I hope I will be able to use it as a map, as a layer of a broader atlas 
that I wish to start studying on in the near future.
This prospective map/layer will have (re)marks (on) of the connections of 
the body that is situated in a context of striated/smooth space, particularly 
architecturally constructed urban space.
10
1 The Body
There has been an accelerated, or rather unprecedented attention and 
concern —in terms of its epidemic influence—, in the human body since the 1980s. 
There has been a growing interest in rethinking and theorizing the human body 
particularly within the scholarly disciplines of humanistic and social sciences, which 
have evolved hand in hand with the acknowledgment of the body within the popular 
realm and everyday life of the capitalist-(post)modern culture.
In the beginning-that was in 1980s—, “it was possible to argue that the body 
was a topic which had been systematically and seriously neglected in the social 
sciences” (Turner 1994: vii). However, straightaway, the number of articles on the 
body-related issues that were published in a variety of social science journals and in 
those of that emerged as the extension of the British cultural studies has increased at 
an unforeseen rate. Thereupon, the contexts of the debated issues in those articles 
that were heated as they hinged on the popular-social realm, to the body and bodily 
matters have begun to be crystallized. Broadly, the issues of the body were 
contextualized as follows: the feminist, women, and queer studies; the complex legal 
and ethical questions of the new medical technologies; the development of the 
virtual reality techniques and the epidemic of the user friendly PC; the overwhelming 
visual environment created by the media and telecommunications; the increasing use 
of cybernetic organisms for industrial and military purposes; and the development of 
an aesthetics of the narcissistic body in consumer culture (Turner 1994: vii).
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The emergence of the books on the body and bodily matters, then, has 
followed these sporadic articles as the concentrated outcome of their intellectual 
accumulation^ These books were, in general, largely influenced by the re-reading of 
the works of Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, 
Michel Foucault, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty along with the impetus of the growing 
criticism of the Cartesian view in philosophy initiated by Edmund Husserl’s studies 
and by Martin Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics (Turner 1994: viii) and elaborated 
by philosophers, most prominently, by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze.
These books’ main concerns, one must note as it is the point I make here, 
were condensed around the contexts that I mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Yet, 
it would not be just to claim that there had been no works related to the bodies prior 
to them. What is new and significant about these works, however, is their context: it 
is the situated corporeality of the (post)modern subject; the conditions and reality of 
the embodiment of the human being in its sociality; the representation of the 
narcissistic carnality; the implicit conceptions of science, industry, and media on the 
body. The concepts that are largely questioned in these studies in addition to the 
body include primarily the self, person, identity, and subject(ivity). The earlier studies 
of the pre-1980s period, which had referred to the body, were predominantly 
questioning the predetermined problematic nodes mthin their institutionalized 
disciplines and the body has always remained as a potential site from where the
 ^Major studies on the body that have published in this period were: David Armstrong’s The 
Political Anatomy of the Body (1983), Don Johnson’s Body (1983), Bryan Turner’s The 
Body and The Society (1984), Francis Baker’s The Tremulous Private Body (1984), John 
O’Neill’s Five Bodies (1985) and The Communicative Body (1989), Emily Martin’s The 
Woman in the Body (1987).
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examples could be drawn (such as anthropology and ethnography of the 
“uncivilized” societies, sociology of religion, etc.)^. Most of the recent approaches 
concerning the body which created a wide spread effect with their relatively 
“alchemistical” methodology (that usually combines philosophy with its own 
discourse) are from a “broader” and different “area” of interest, precisely from that 
of cultural studies that has emerged in mid 1960s at the Center for Contemporary 
Studies at Birmingham. However, the conventional indirect approach to the body in a 
way has not been significantly challenged as theses studies are more focused on 
certain problematic nodes in specific contexts (feminism, power of the state, 
subordination of the other, etc.). There are extremely few figures that consistently try 
to write on exclusively the body in a variety of fields. The formation of the body itself 
and the formation of the conceptions on the body both in its natural and cultural 
aspects are yet to be questioned^.
Fragments for a History of the Human Body edited by Michel Feher et al. in 
1989 is the compilation made up of three large volumes that demonstrates the quality 
and divergence of the studies on the body has reached far beyond than it was 
anticipated. This voluminous study can be considered as the precursor and sign of 
the forthcoming works which have either strived to concentrate on the corporeal 
“reality” of the human being in a certain socially problematic context or endeavoured
 ^Such as Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger (1966), and Natural Symbols (1970), and before 
that, the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and 
Robert Hertz (Turner 1994: viii).
3 Perhaps the most significant among them is Elizabeth Grosz although she is usually 
categorized as being only a feminist writer. She writes, however, on the body in a great
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to map the philosophical, psychoanalytical and/or social notions and conceptions of 
the body* *. Hence, today, it is not possible to persist with Turner’s claim (“it was 
possible to argue that the body was a topic which had been systematically and 
seriously neglected in the social sciences”) any longer. Nevertheless to the same 
degree, it is not either possible to claim that we have a coherent and comprehensive 
theory of the body which would address the huge range of problems relating to the 
issue of human embodiment, the body, and the body image^.
This is definitely true even if one can assert that, following Hwa Yol Jung, 
“writing the body has become rather modish and proliferated in recent years” (1996: 
16). However, Jung himself immediately admits that: “the philosophical question of 
the body still remains fragmentary and escapes any systematic inquiry” (1996: 17). 
Therefore, I suggest to proceed with exploring the points in western philosophy from 
which this inadequacy stemmed: i.e., Cartesianism and mainstream structuralism, as 
they are largely claimed to be the two major raison d ’être of the accelerated debates on 
the body.
diversity, her contextual concerns have a variety that shifts from architecture to science, from 
technology to sex, from feminism to psychoanalysis.
** See the Selected Bibliography.
 ^ This is perhaps the only point that everyone unequivocally shares and puts forth among 
who writes on and around the bodily issues. The autliors of the books that I have consulted 
or scanned (not only the ones I cited) touch this point as “lack” and/or “neglect”, thus 
propose her own way of proceeding accordingly. I will refer to the sources of tliis lack by 
giving examples in the following paragraphs.
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1.1 Disembodied Descartes
Cogito ergo sum
Why was there an apparent absence of sociological interest in the 
body until very recently? Why has there been this recent 
development of interest in the subject, an interest by no means 
confined to sociological writings but to be found across a wide 
spectrum of social science disciplines? (Scott and Morgan 1993: 1)
Scott and Morgan asked these questions in 1993 while they were trying to 
map the recent sociological concern for human body. One year prior to that, on the 
back cover of Bryan Turner’s book Regulating Bodies: Essays in Medical Sociology 
there was a similar question: “Why has sociology systematically neglected the most 
elementary fact of human existence, our embodiment?” (1992). “The mystery of the 
body is not solved by any biological or physiological knowledge -which is in fact only 
one mode of objectivizing the body in a certain epistemic discourse” writes Pasi Falk 
to show the inadequacy of the natural sciences in understanding the body (1994: 1). 
Falk, yet points out the social sciences have also been ignorant to the body through 
its abstraction of the human being as a mere agent or actor: “turning the body into a 
blind-spot, is characteristic of the sociological tradition, from the classics onwards” 
(1994:2). Chris Shilling makes a similar point: he states that sociology “has adapted a 
disembodied approach towards its subject matter” because bodies were regarded as 
“both natural and individual possessions which lay outside of the legitimate social 
concerns of the discipline” (1993: 19). Bryan Turner, accepting this inadequacy, coins
René Descartes in Discourse on Method. Cogito ergo sum\ I think therefore I exist.
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the term “somatic society” and proposes a research agenda in order to describe how 
the body in modern social systems has become “the principal field of political and 
cultural activity” (1992: 12,162). He believes that the contemporary (western) society 
is a society “within which major political and personal problems are problematized in 
the body and expressed through it” (1996: 1). It is possible to quote much more 
comments from numerous sources, which emphasize the neglected issues of the 
body and which bring forward the importance of theorizing on the body. I believe, at 
this moment it is not necessary to do so since both the importance and subordination 
of the body will be tried to be delineated in the following sections and chapters 
throughout, and from various perspectives and philosophies.
As it can be understood via the quotations cited above, social sciences and 
particularly sociology is the major, yet remained implicit, concern in this study . 
Sociology as being the science or study of the development, organization, and 
functioning of human society; the science of the fundamental laws of social 
relations, institutions, is the “discipline” tliat the problematic situation of the body 
comes forth most clearly. Yet, as we shall soon see that, although gradually, what lies 
underneath the problem is basically the inadequacy of the philosophical approach of the 
western-analytical thought, which has effected -or perhaps has infected— in its
Having said that, I would like to remind the reader that the boundary and field of 
knowledge and interests particularly of the social sciences has demonstrated a constantly 
shifting, changing, expanding profile, starting from the beginning. It is inherent in the 
definition of the “social” science perse. As the “social” is an ever-changing dynamic “being”, 
a living thing, the social sciences have no other chance but to follow it in an ever-expanding, 
ever-changing fashion.
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particular history, not only the social sciences, but any activity that is based on its 
particular “rationality”.
Scott and Morgan assert that there are contradictions within sociological 
point of view regarding the body and bodily matter (1993: 5). Although sociology has 
always demonstrated a tendency to criticize reductionist explanations, sociologists 
have tended to let, for instance, biology and biological base to stay outside the realm 
of sociological analysis. As the importance of biology is minimized and extra 
emphasis is placed on the “social”, social/natural dichotomy along with mind/body 
binary opposition is maintained. Scott and Morgan criticize this particular inadequacy 
of sociology in the field:
We would suggest that by not challenging biological understandings 
directly, sociology has left them intact rather than displaying them as 
cultural constructions, and that sociology’s past failure to lay claim 
to the body has effectively left the way open for the increasing 
influence of sociobiology, which takes ideological understandings of 
the natural inevitability of certain bodily processes and practices 
and presents them back to us cocooned in scientific language. We 
would agree with Connel that ‘bodies grow, work, flourish and 
decay in social situations that produce bodily effects’ (1987:86) and 
consider that these processes are relatively under theorized. (Scott 
and Morgan 1993: 5)
In order to develop a better understanding of the social place of the body 
and of the ways in which we experience ourselves as embodied, it is recommended 
that the biology must be located historically and cultural^ (Scott and Morgan 1993: 6). 
Biomedicine, only by itself, is not enough and adequate to cover the body issue. 
Sociology has recognized body as a social and cultural construction but has long 
neglected to take into account that common bodily activities also require an organic 
foundation. Cartesian mind that fosters clear distinctions between the pairs of 
“binary oppositions”, is claimed to bear the responsibility of the situation.
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As it is broadly exemplified in Turner’s (1992) account, social sciences have 
in general accepted the Cartesian legacy that brings forth dualism, reductionism and 
positivism. Since Cartesianism sees tlie world as such, a principal assumption has been 
developed concerning mind and the body. For Cartesianism, always a clear distinction 
could be drawn between the ordered, the controlled and the abstract on the one end, 
and the disordered, the uncontrolled and the concrete and on the other,. Believing 
there is no significant interaction in between the pair, these two realms can be 
addressed by separate and distinctive disciplines. Therefore, the body became the 
subject of natural sciences including medicine, whereas the mind became the topic of 
humanities or cultural sciences. Scott and Morgan suggest that sociology must open 
the biological-natural “package” and insert history and culture. By doing this, they 
assert that “an understanding of the relationship between the social and biological as 
one of practical relevance rather than causation” could be developed (Scott and 
Morgan 1993: 6).
Throughout the course of history, we see the relative importance of mind 
and body varies historically and culturally. In medicine for instance, prior to 
nineteenth century in Europe there was no clear conception of mental illness; such 
symptoms were either the result of the sin or possession, the product of physical 
excess or imbalances, or simply the result of birth defects. Actually, this conception 
was a result of the exaltation of “the absolute” and “the transcendental” against “the 
concrete”. Whereas with the rise of psychoanalysis, the muid became an important 
province in its own right as a producer of symptoms and physical illness. The 
concept of “psychosomatic” illness, as Turner points out, considers some illness as 
they actually “does not exist because it is only in the mind” (1992: 32). Psycho and 
somatic are thought as clearly distinct and thus they should be examined by strictly
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separate and distinct disciplines. Yet, surprising as it may be, the body contradictorily 
remains to be a very strong element within the psychoanalytic theory, and particularly 
within the Freudian and Lacanian theories of the formation of the ego (see sections 
3.1 and 3.2). Nevertheless, as David Krueger points out, although Freud recognized 
the body as the foundation for subsequent ego development, “the body and its 
evolving mental representations have largely been omitted from developmental and 
psychoanalytic theory” (1989: ix).
“The Cartesian revolution” states Turner, “gave a privileged status to mind as 
the definition of the person (‘I think, therefore I am’) and an underprivileged status 
to the body which was simply a machine” (1996: 74). In another order of words, 
“Descartes’s ‘epistemocracy’ or his epistemological regime of philosophy in pursuit 
of the cogito is marked by disembodiment, egocentricity, and ocularcentricity. For in it 
the mind becomes transcendentalized from rather than immanentized in the body” 
(Jung 1996: 3). “The mind/body opposition”, moreover and more importantly, “has 
always been correlated a number of other oppositional pairs”: reason and passion, 
sense and sensibility, outside and inside, self and other, depth and surface, reality and 
appearance, mechanism and vitalism, transcendence and immanence, temporality and 
spatiality, psychology and physiology, form and matter (Grosz 1994:3).
However, a reservation should be clearly made here. Descartes’s view has 
been, in fact, disembodied within the evolutionary process of the western (natural and 
social/humanistic) sciences and philosophy . It is not actually, Descartes himself that *
* That should clarify the choice of the title of this section as Disembodied Descartes and 
not, for instance, as Descartes Disembodies.
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should bear the responsibility for the dualism, reductionism, and positivism diat 
gained such a strength to become hegemonic, but the “mentality” that is constructed 
under the generic term “Cartesianism”, after him:
It is clear from a reading of Descartes’s The Discourse on Method 
that he believed that there was in fact a significant interaction 
between the body and mind and that disease was the outcome of 
any disturbance in this interaction. Descartes’s dualistic 
interactionism eventually came to evolve in tlie natural sciences into 
a unitary and positivistic perspective of materialism in which the 
disciplines that attempt to develop an understanding of events in 
nature and society, body and mind were both isolated and 
specialized. (Turner 1996: 9)
1.2 Derrida Deconstructing
The center is not the cen ter.
Jacques Derrida has introduced the deconstructionist criticism on the 
foundations of the western “metaphysics”, on the structuralist way of thinking and 
the presumptuous logocentric methodology that western culture has been exerting in 
every field of reasoning. Therefore, it is well worth to discuss his contribution as it is 
related with the issues put forth in the previous section. Although, the problematic 
neglecting of the body within the western philosophy has largely been attributed to 
Descartes and his dualistic approach, it is the mainstream structuralist vision that has
Jacques Derrida in Writing and Difference.
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firmly established the systematic thinking with dichotomous terms at the 
“foundations” of the western disciplines. In order to understand adequately the 
“inherent” contradictions that have emerged form this particular discourse, I submit, 
it is inevitable to refer to Deconstruction and to its hosts'* .^
Derrida has pointed out the inadequacy of the methodology and 
consequences of western reasoning by disclosing the very kernel of the western 
thought and vision through re-reading of texts “within a discourse”. In order to 
elucidate the essence of the criticism that Derrida has developed via his sui generis 
methodology I suggest to begin with reviewing the premise of structuralist linguistics 
and of structuralist anthropology. The premise of Saussurian linguistics served as a 
general model for many prominent names in their most influential works. Some of 
the well-known personalities and their fields are Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, Lacan 
in psychoanalysis, and Althusser in political theory. One must be thankful to these 
diverse studies as Derrida himself admits that without the way paved by 
structuralism, deconstructionist approach could not have been achieved, at least, at 
that time (Norris 1987: 24)^*.
Since deconstruction is not a philosophy but a critical tool, a cautious approach, it needs 
an exteriority for it to operate. It is usually referred as having qualities of a virus! Virus: 
metabolically inert, infectious agent that replicates only within the cells of living “hosts”. The 
host being here is basically the dichotomous thought, the bipolar opposition witli an 
hegemonic pole. I believe the concept of “writing” of Derrida is one of the most “suitable” 
processes of his deconstructionist approach in our case, as western dichotomous thought is 
claimed to be the major impediment for the body to liberate itself from being subordinated.
Norris writes that Derrida makes tliis point clear, but he does not refer to a specific 
instance.
21
In the Course in General Linguistics. Ferdinand de Saussure says, “Writing, 
though unrelated to its inner system, is used continually to represent language. We 
cannot simply disregard it. We must be acquainted with its usefulness, shortcomings 
and dangers” (Saussure 1974:84) . This description of writing can be taken as a 
token of Saussure’s attitude to the priority of spoken as opposed to written in his 
analysis of language system, which is implicitly manifesting the subordination of the 
concrete to the transcendental in general, and of the body to the mind in our case.
The priority of spoken language to written, however, is not the only 
manifestation of the struggle between the binary concepts that Saussure had 
consistently introduced and strived to demonstrate the superiority of one concept to 
the other. Saussure, on his way to “construct” modern linguistics, used a series of 
examples of dualist vision . His theoretical construction based on the pairs of 
concepts that he defined and these always imply a whole that is conceived as bisected; 
a “unity” made of two parts sequenced in a hierarchical manner: centeral/peripheral, 
primary/secondary, internal/external, reality/image and so on. Saussure’s phonocentric 
vision, also, brings forth hierarchy along with a conception of perverted, and then.
1.2.1 Structuralist Bipolarity in Linguistic “Writing”
12 Saussure continues, “Writing veils the appearance of language; it is not a guise for 
language but a disguise”. I have used the verb “says” as this book is a compilation of 
Saussure’s lecture notes by his students. It is noteworthy that Saussure himself did not write 
a book!
13 The pairs he utilized are scattered all through die rationale of his linguistics and used in 
every stage of it: signifier-signified, langue-parole, synchronic-diachronic, paradigm-syntagm.
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expelled elements, which in fact, are intrinsic to it. He consequently claims that 
writing is “external”, “foreign”, “from outside”, i.e. it is perverse, directed away from 
the “origin”, from what is “right”, from what is “good”.
Since there is a tradition in western philosophical thinking that the good is 
whatever is going along with the reason, spirit or soul, hence for Saussure, writing 
becomes evil (Norris 1987: 88). Saussure, here, primarily conceives writing in the 
narrow sense as the marks and graphic inscriptions on a page. I shall soon discuss 
how Derrida argues writing in a broader sense and demonstrates how it is attached to 
the mainstream western thought and to the logocentrism innate to it. As a 
preparation to that, however, I must elaborate more on Saussure’s thoughts on 
writing as he thinks it is outside of the “natural bond” between sound and sense, in 
other words alien to the “natural bond” between speech and self-present thought.
As Saussure wants to insulate “natural” language against all the detrimental 
effects that he believed caused by writing he strived to exclude it. For Saussure, 
writing is a sign of a sign, which consequently places writing in a state defined as a 
supplementary inscription, and thus it is eliminated from, removed from origins and 
truth even twice (Norris 1987: 85). This, I believe, clarifies the metaphysical belief in 
Saussure’s conception that writing always operates from “outside”. It is believed to 
be an agent that corrupts the purity of speech, which is the “true” and “good” 
constituent of language. As the speech implies the “presence”, the outsider -writing- 
assaults to the self-presence, to the self present thought, to the speaker. Writing is an 
image, Saussure contemplates, therefore how can it replace or be as important or 
essential as the reality, i.e. speech? What is not present can not be reliable. However, 
since language is a differential system, meaning of a sign -thus of a signifier- can
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only be achieved through the difference it acquires through the relation to others, since 
there is no self-identical elements.
Here, at this point and on the contrary to Saussure’s conception, it can be 
said that differential theory of meaning, by definition, needs the relations defined or 
grasped by “images” in order to be operative. The differences between signs —images, 
representations of the reality— can only be achieved again via images.
1.2.2 Structuralist Bipolarity in Anthropological “Writing”
In The Raw and the Cooked. Claude Lévi-Strauss writes, “Either structural 
analysis succeeds in exhausting all the concrete modalities of its subject or we lose 
the right to apply it to one of the modalities” (1969: 147). Lévi-Strauss strongly 
believed that the powerful tools and explanations that had been brought forth by 
structural linguistics could also be used in other fields. His anthropological insight, 
along with the mainstream philosophical trends of his time, caused him to perceive 
his main subject matter as “languages” or signifying systems. He has envisaged 
certain codes that are to be disclosed within certain societies and basically within 
primitive societies as they are his main concern. Myth and ritual being his primary 
fields of interest, Lévi-Strauss has a conviction that by analyzing myths and rituals it 
is possible to achieve a revelation of the patterns of development. Consequently, for 
Lévi-Strauss, this achievement is supposed to reveal the similarities and distinctions 
between cultures. This approach implies a deterministic and positivistic vision, i.e. 
every problem that is formulated can be explained by unambiguous, unequivocal 
reasoning on the basis of “clear-cut” cause-effect relationship.
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Lévi-Strauss’s project, consequently in order to be complete, requires 
defining distinctions as a prerequisite. That is how Lévi-Strauss introduced the 
dichotomy of nature/culture in the realm of his structural anthropology. There are 
similarities between Lévi-Strauss’s ethnocentric approach and of Saussure’s phonocetttric 
approach, both approaches being different forms of western logocentrism. In addition, 
“nature” is conceived by Lévi-Strauss in Rousseauesque manner, a unified, complete 
whole and as a “pure, unmediated speech” (Norris 1982: 40). Lévi-Strauss, in his 
book Tristes Tropiques (published in English in 1966, the year that Derrida has 
delivered his critique on it) concentrates how writing, as a foreign, evil agent of a 
degenerated “culture”, did changed the “natural” lives of a primitive society. A 
chapter called “The Writing Lesson” in the book is dedicated to Lévi-Strauss’s 
ambivalent feelings of guilt and fascination on this subject matter. He encountered an 
Amerindian tribe, the Nambikvara, that does not know writing —in the sense that 
using graphic marks representing spoken language. Lévi-Strauss was struck by the 
fact that, as he introduced writing to the “natural” lives of the tribe, it was their 
leader that grasp the possible implications of it most clearly and quickly. Lévi- 
Strauss’s comment on that what the leader actually grasped is “how writing could be 
used in the interests of maintaining an unequal distribution of knowledge and 
power” (Norris 1987: 130).
Lévi-Strauss concludes that by the introduction of himself (his presence) and 
of writing the bad and evil hegemony of western culture, has dominated the tribe 
which had been in a pure and innocent face-to-face natural contact (spoken language, 
speech) up until that time.
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Derrida’s choice of Saussure is said to be strategic and for two reasons 
(Critchley 1992: 34). First reason is Saussure’s structural linguistics stimulated 
hegemony of a certain vision -o f what Derrida calls structuralism in general— in the 
human sciences at that time. Second reason is the fact that Saussure’s discourse can 
be made use of to achieve a more general notion. This understanding, for Derrida, is 
crucial. This is an understanding, which would reveal that all “discourse” is of 
imperative sort since the framework of discourse constructed in such a way to 
“exclude” any vision that can transgress itself That is to say “. . . all discourse is 
strategic, because no transcendental truth or point of reference is present outside the 
field of discourse which would govern that field” (Critchley 1992: 35). This is an 
essential point in Derrida’s way to elucidate how “writing” is repressed as, for 
Derrida, Saussure failed to realize the dilemma engendered by its own “mode of 
discourse”.
Saussure thinks that there is a “natural bond” only between sound and sense, 
between speech and self-present thought altliough the bond between the signifier and 
signified remains arbitrary. Saussure, consequently, conceives the writing as a 
dangerous supplement to speech, as a mere representation, a mere image of speech, 
thus, as a derivative and secondary form of the primary reality, of the primary 
presence; the presence of a speaker. This is to declare subordination. The 
subordination of writing to speech is again a consequence of the “constructed” 
struggle between the constituents of a dichotomy. Placing one of the constituents in 
the center would cause the other one to become blurred and to be placed under the 
dominance of the one in the center. Saussure made a “clear” distinction between
1.2.3 Derrida’s “Writing”
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speech and writing and speech became the governing central concept. Derrida
opposes to this limitation:
External/internal, image/reality, representation/presence, such is 
the old grid to which is given the task of outlining the domain of a 
science. And of what science? Of a science that can no longer 
answer to the classical concept of the épistémè because the originality 
of its field-an originality that it inaugurates-is tliat the opening of 
the “image” within it appears as the condition of “reality;” a 
relationship that can no longer be tliought within the simple 
difference and the uncompromising exteriority of “image” and 
“reality”, of “outside” and “inside”, of “appearance” and 
“essence”, with the entire system of oppositions which necessarily 
follows from it. (Derrida 1976: 33)
Saussure says that the natural bond, the only true bond is the bond of sound, 
and writing does not have this “natural” peculiarity. We have seen that for Saussure 
writing is a “sign of a sign”, i.e. an image of, a representation of the signifier, and it is 
twice removed from origins and truth. Derrida expounds proficiently that since 
language is “already” a system of differential signs it means the meaning lies “in 
various structures of relationship and not in some ideal correspondence between 
sound and sense” (Norris 1987: 85). This means tlie classical definition of writing 
would apply to every form  o f language whatsoever.
Derrida, therefore, here means that “meaning” is always the “sign of a sign” 
and consequently “writing” is supplementary, though essential, to language. This is 
simply because of the fact that thought can not avoid this logic of endless 
supplementarity. Saussure, according to Derrida, by introducing the concept of 
arbitrariness of the sign actually puts the opposition between speech and writing in a 
vague situation, which in the end brings the whole dichotomy at stake.
Saussure excluded writing from language and chased it to its outer 
fringes because he considered it to be only an exterior reflection of 
the reality of language, that is, nothing but an image, a
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representation or a figuration. The thesis of arbitrariness, according 
to Derrida, “successfully accounts for a conventional relationship 
between the phoneme and the grapheme . . . [and] by tlie same 
token it forbids that the latter be an ‘image’ of the former” (OG, 
p.45). (Gasche 1994: 44)*'*
Hence, the very basic modus operandi of the western thought has been 
disturbed by Derrida’s (deconstructionist) re-reading of Saussure’s and numerous 
texts those of western philosophers. That of Saussure’s being one of the most 
important among them not only as it is apt to demonstrate the superficiality of 
binary oppositions, but also for the fact that it has been influential for the modus 
operandi of many works in various fields that have succeeded also.
“Writing” both as a token and as a crucial “reality” has been used in 
Deconstruction to show the “complexity of references” to which Derrida draws our 
attention. It helps us to conceive the predetermined, discursive, teleological 
commitment to “unity” of structuralist vision. Deconstruction proves that western 
metaphysical thought, which is conceived as a page with two “distinct and separated” 
sides, is actually an illusion. The reality that deconstruction observes is more like a 
Möbius strip. A one sided surface actually formed by turning over one end of a page 
by and attaching the opposite corners to each other. Although there is always an 
“other” side, one would experience that it has, in effect, a virtual “continuity”, which
Actually this book of Rodolpho Gasche’s claims to be “A deconstruction of the criticism 
that goes by deconstruction’s name, this book reveals the true philosophical nature of 
Derrida’s thought, its debt to the tradition it engages, and its misuse by some of its most 
fervent admirers . . . explodes the current myth of Derrida’s singularity and sets in its place a 
finely informed sense of the philosopher’s genuine accomplishment.” However, Gasche does 
not try to diminish neither Derrida’s contribution nor the importance of the 
Deconstructionist thinking, but to develop a deeper understanding of it. See Gasche 1987: 3- 
20.
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is not broken or disrupted, which does not allow you to decide “clearly” which side 
you are travelling at a certain moment. Since you are (thinking, reading, experiencing, 
living) in continuous movement, no side would be more superior to the other. For 
one moment, you are “inside”, which you can comprehend, understand, experience 
only with reference to the essential supplementarity of the other side, the next 
moment, you are “outside”. The issue is, however, it is totally undecidable to 
determine perpetually which side is inside and which side is outside; what is up and 
what is down, where is the beginning and where is the end, but perhaps, moffiefttarily.
To proceed with the other major structuralist vision is necessary in terms of 
demonstrating Derrida’s contribution more clearly. Lévi-Strauss comprehends that 
the primitive society he has examined as living in an “idyll of undisturbed primitive 
peace”(Norris 1987: 129). The basic premise behind this, for Lévi-Strauss, is that they 
do not have the knowledge of writing. Writing penetrated into Nambikvara tribe as 
the graphic representation of the spoken language in the beginning, yet Lévi-Strauss 
claims it is then actually shifted into a metonymical level. Writing, therefore, now 
stands for the ethnocentric belief in the superiority of European culture with all the 
corruption adhered to it. He admires the less “advanced” people living close to 
“nature” (see Rousseauesque “nature” in next subsection).
Lévi-Strauss dislikes the tight dependence of western culture on the 
historical progress and technological development, which he thinks is the main 
reason for the corruption of the social system. He also finds himself responsible for 
the negative change in the social structure of Nambikvara tribe, and deduces that it is 
his presence is the primary cause for this change for the worse along with the writing he 
introduced. However, as opposed to what Lévi-Strauss conjures the tribe have 
“already” been living in a social order somehow similar to that of more “advanced”
29
cultures. There are already hierarchy, ranking and inequality between different social 
groups. That is why the leader -leadership is the “highest rank” granted for the 
capabilities of the bearer- grasped the power and implications of writing so quickly.
Derrida shows that Lévi-Strauss’s discourse, similar to that of Saussure’s, 
reveals the deep convictions and presumptions that he cannot purge no matter how 
he tries. “What Lévi-Strauss actually writes and what he would have us believe are two 
very different things” (Norris 1987: 130). Although Lévi-Strauss feels sympathy for 
Nambikvara and their “natural” life, still his approach is ethnocentric. In other words, 
he accepts the difference between people with writing and people without writing, 
but he implicitly uses standard concepts of speech and writing when it comes to 
categorize people-without-writing in terms of “their” cultural and historical values. 
His approach is ethnocentric because he excludes the writing —writing in broader 
sense— since he envisages it only as the privileged model of phonetic writing. “Lévi- 
Strauss has strong presumptions in the form of distinctions between historical 
societies and societies without history remain solely dependent on the concept of 
writing” (Derrida 1976: 121). This is how he develops his “epigenetic” idea of 
writing as the exclusive and sudden cause for the degeneration of the Nambikvara 
that only had pure and innocent spoken language up until that time.
Although Lévi-Strauss tries to avoid ethnocentrism, by the very fact that 
using a sharp distinction between speech and writing, his ideas fall prey back to it. 
Moreover, this ethnocentrism is even the source of Lévi-Strauss’s accusation of the 
western culture: “It supports an ethico-political accusation: man’s exploitation by 
man is the fact of writing cultures of the Western type. Communities of innocent 
and unoppressive speech are free from this accusation” (Derrida 1976: 121).
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I have tried to show, though briefly and as concise as possible, the basic 
premises of structuralist linguistics and of structural anthropology. I have also tried 
to furnish it with Derrida’s re-reading of the texts and discourses of Saussure’s and 
of Levi-Strauss’s. Now the time has come for to concentrate more on the Derrida’s 
“notion” of imting, which is one of the important constituents of his 
deconstructionist vision.
As John Sallis summarizes, “deconstruction would announce the liberation of 
writing from the repression enforced by/as metaphysics, its release from 
subordination to speech and thereby, finally, to presence” (Sallis 1987: xii). “Writing” 
in western culture, for Derrida, is actually beyond every kind of graphic sign. It lies in 
the “complexity of references”. It is what is expelled. It is what is in the blindspot, 
in-between. It is the silence in-between. It is what is not present. It is the absent; yet 
its “absent presence” is an essential supplementarity.
“Writing” is what is conceived as evil. It is, even, death:
What writing itself, in its non-phonetic movement, betrays is life. It 
menaces at once the breath, the spirit, and history as the spirit’s 
relationship with itself It is their end, their finitude, their paralysis.
(Derrida 1976: 25)
“Writing” is supplementary, but its supplementarity is essential, vital and 
constitutive. It is the whole supplementary elements in western thought and culture 
that is repressed in the name of clarity, for the sake of being lined up on the side of 
good and right. It is what is cursed for being perverted. It is the oscillations in 
meaning. It is the other; it is what makes our “essential” tie with the other 
unavoidable, that is inevitable for us to become “ourselves”, as David Wood observes:
Writing is the death of presence in that it inscribes any meaning in a 
play or economy of signification, which essentially disperses any
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sense -immediate or mediated- of self-presence, of absolute 
interiority, or self-relatedness. (1987: 155)
“Writing”, even in the sense of graphical representation is beyond the 
alphabetical marks. It is in the silence between the marks, between the letters. 
Writing, even, is inbetween the spoken words; it is a constituent of the speech. It is 
the condition and effect of the undecidable, undetermined movement of the 
“references”. This movement is like an “undecidable” orbital movement. A 
“metaphor*^” of the movement of electron around the nucleus can be made here, I 
suggest. It is impossible, at least for today, to determine the position (or speed) of it 
without disturbing the speed (or position) of it. If you manage to determine one of 
them (speed or position) you disturb and miss the other. One of the constituents of 
it must be “absent” for the other to be “present”. It is simply because you have to use 
an electron microscope to “see” the electron. Thinking is a similar process: your tool 
becomes your subject that you want to explore and disclose; it shifts to another 
position, to another reference as you strive to grasp it.
What Derrida says, or writes, is not that writing dominates speech, or what is 
repressed governs the one supposedly placed in the origin, in the center as there can 
be no fixed center. The continuum of the deferral-and-difference in the meaning that 
is emanated from the complexity of references has always been and will always be
I am not sure, though, that this remains to be a mere metaphor: thinking is possible only 
at the molecular level, there are electrically charged molecules and impulses travelling around 
all through the central nervous system which includes the brain. “The nervous system 
contains immense numbers of distinct nerve cells, which make close contact with each other 
at synapses. An impulse, when it reaches a synapse, has to stimulate the next nerve cell. . . . 
An impulse can promote or inhibit numerous other activities, according to the state of other 
parts of the nervous system. Very complicated co-ordination is, therefore, possible with 
suitably complex connections.” (Abercrombie, et al. 1981)
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existing through the struggle in the process of comprehending, experiencing, and 
giving meaning to the world we live in.
1.2.4 The Body and Deconstruction o f the Dichotomous “Mind”
Whether they be implicit or explicit, dichotomies have long been the main 
analytical and systematic constituting tools of western thought. It is by now, well 
known that with the introduction of Deconstructionist tools that suggest to change 
the “habits of our minds” that had been constructed since the Enlightenment (by 
using the very same faculties of mind), the basic organizing principles have been 
shattered. As the logocentric thought ascribed a center, which was the organizing 
principle in the structural systems, it ordered our philosophical tliinking and the 
whole western episteme. Serpil Tunc Oppermann epitomizes Jacques Derrida’s 
contribution succinctly:
Derrida attacked this assumption lying behind the whole tradition 
of Western metaphysics, and rejected the dominance of the key 
concepts, such as God, nature, reason, meaning, self, origin, truth, 
etc., because they have become self-presencing and signs of Being; 
the signifiers that turn into transcendental signifieds (any sort of 
final meaning). (Oppermann 1991: 34)
Although Derrida has never directly contemplates on the body in length and 
its place within the binary oppositions, as Turner points out, in contemporary social 
theory as a consequence of Derrida’s approach, the body is regarded as a constructed 
issue through discourses such as medical, moral, artistic, and commercial (1992: 8). I 
presume, whilst tracing Derrida’s deconstruction of the dichotomous habit of 
thinking it would be highly interesting to give instances related to the conceptions of
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the body when we conceive it as a text and try to read it in a Derridian way of 
thinking. I believe, the body can be conceived as text because, in the first place, it 
always refers to an external reference. Since deconstruction is viral, it requires a 
discursive textuality for it to operate: the Cartesian distinction of mind and body is 
very convenient one in terms of forming a illusory hegemonic relationship of the 
terms of the pair which are actually essential supplements to each other.
Derrida’s careful analysis of the sign and of the Saussurian idea of difference 
leads to several important, indeed far-reaching insights. To describe the structure of 
the sign, which he sees as always already marked by both deferring and differitig, Derrida 
coins the term différance (both meanings occur in the French verb différer). Douglas 
Atkins draws our attention to the notion of différance that Derrida defines in Positions
as:
“. . . the systematic play of differences, of tlie traces of tlie 
differences, of tine spacing by means of which elements are related 
to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive 
(the a of dfferance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and 
passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between 
the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without 
which the “full” terms would not signify, would not function”. The 
possibility of the sign, substituting for the thing in a system of 
differences, thus depends upon deferral, that is, putting off into die 
future any grasping of the “thing itself’. (Atkins 1983: 17)
In the movement of thought, elements are never fully present because they 
must always already refer to something other than “themselves”, or, to change 
perspectives, if perception of objects depends upon perception of their differences, 
each “present” element must refer to an element other than “itself’. Gayatri Spivak, 
accordingly, calls the “trace” as “the part played by the radically other within the 
structure of difference that is the sign” and proceeds to term it “the mark of the
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absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that 
is condition of thought and experience” (Spivak 1976: xvii).
Here, though briefly, it is possible to mention Mikhail Bakhtin for the simple 
fact that in his book Art and Answerability he envisages mind and the body not as 
oppositions but as differing stages of a mitinuum (Bakhtin 1990: xxxiv). In Bakhtin’s 
writings, it is possible to trace tlie roots of same conception of dynamics; non-static, 
non-stopped, intertwined journey of break and flow or cause and effect cycles (cf. 
Deleuze-and-Guattari’s Body). Bakhtin’s “grotesque body”, for instance, “degrades” 
the human form in a positive way whilst not confining itself within the restrictions of 
one side of the binary opposition. Obviously this point of view is closer to tliat of 
Derrida’s who states the impossibility of static unity as well as its undecidability, 
which stems from the fact that signifier-signified cycle is in constant motion.
Sally Banes quotes from Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World:
Degradation here means coming down to eartli, the contact with 
earth as an element that swallows up and gives birth at the same 
time. To degrade is to bury, to sow, and to kill simultaneously, in 
order to bring forth something more and better. To degrade also 
means to concern oneself with the lower stratum of the body, the 
life of the belly and the reproductive organs; it therefore relates to 
acts of defecation and copulation, conception, pregnancy and birtli.
(Banes 1993: 284nll)
That is to say, as Banes puts it in a laconic way: “ bringing its subjects down 
to earth, it reembodies what official culture had disembodied, or etherealized” (1993: 
193). The body here is emphasized as the “absent present” in the official culture and 
modern society. Bakhtin has tried to demonstrate “it” via emphasizing the 
subordinated, expelled activities of the body.
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Derrida asserts that, because the structure of the sign is determined by the 
“trace” or track of that other which is forever absent, the word “sign” must be placed 
“under erasure.” Without, of course, establishing absence in its place, the “trace” 
destroys the idea of simple presence, the desire which, Derrida claims in Of 
Grammatology. characterizes western metaphysics:
Without the possibility of differance, the desire of presence as such 
would not find its breathing space. That means similarly that this 
desire carries in itself the destiny of its non-satisfaction. Differance 
produces what it forbids, makes possible the very tiling tliat it 
makes impossible. (Derrida 1976: 19)
The “idea of origin” is similarly destroyed, for origin is always other tlian 
“itself’, the idea of origin depending upon the production of temporal and spatial 
difference that must precede any origin. Denied, too, are those other central 
oppositions of metaphysics not only, truth/error, presence/absence, 
identity/difference and speech/writing, but also, nature/culture, mind/body, soul/ 
matter, man/woman, being/nothingness, life/death, good/evil, and master/slave, 
self/other, and so on.
Obviously, as Spivak observes, Derrida is asking us “to change certain habits 
of mind: . . . the origin is a trace; contradicting logic, we must learn to use and erase 
our language at the same time” (Spivak 1976: xviii). Always criticism and analysis, in 
the “classical” sense, strive to decide the meaning, the closure of the text. Criticism has 
become a desire of presence. But “meaning” as a privileged term refers to something 
outside textuality, outside the system of differences: a text’s meaning is the truth that 
is present “behind” or “under” its textual surface that criticism makes fully present 
placing it before us. Nevertheless, the “trace”, of course, makes meaning so 
conceived —like truth and presence- impossible. To repeat, there is no originating.
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privileged signified outside the system of differences and so no fixed “meaning” (cf 
Nietzsche’s Body).
Taking Derrida’s conception of “writing” -which is the writing in the 
broadest sense, intertwined with everyday life- it can be said that writing is any 
experience that appears as an inscription on the body as well as in unconscious. If, we 
accept the idea of “body as a text” (which comprises writing) then Derrida’s ideas on 
sign, difference, origin and meaning seem like opening the gates of a new 
understanding in the “process of defining” the embodied self, person, or subject 
which offers promising horizons much more wider than those of dichotomies. Then 
it would be possible not to be strangled with the idea of pinning down and thus 
fixing the embodied self or corporeal subject, which never ceases changing, making 
connections, moving, and becoming and which is always positioned only with 
reference to the “trace” (perhaps, the other bodies, subjects and objects). The body in 
our “minds” is struggling inbetwecn the essential-mutual-supplementarity of the 
mind/body, soul/matter, inside/outside of the fractured self (cf Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Body).
Derrida’s objection to the opposition of nature and culture (that separated 
with a clear distinction) is well worth to mention. While “reading” Jacques Rousseau’s 
Essay on the Origin of Language Derrida deconstructs the implicit dichotomous 
thought and its hierarchical order by demonstrating the inevitable supplementarity. In 
Rousseau’s opinion, man living in nature in a happy state realizes the need for a 
society. During the transformation into society from nature, culture becomes a state 
of happiness for man. This means, for Rousseau, that culture “supplemented” nature. 
He, accordingly, thinks that education is a supplement to nature. Nature is 
“complete” in principle and education becomes a subordinated external addition to
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it. Obviously, as Jonathan Culler puts it, this need for a “supplementarity” discloses 
an inherent lack or incompleteness in the nature as it must be completed for meeting 
the requirements of man for man’s human nature to be emerged “as it truly is” 
(1983: 104):
The logic of pioussean] supplementarity thus makes nature the 
prior term, a plenitude that there is at the start, but reveals an 
inherent lack or absence within it, so that education, die additional 
extra, also becomes an essential condition of diat which it 
supplements. (Culler 1983: 104)
It has been well known, for instance, as a central example that sex and 
gender understood as clearly distinct categories, although they are “embodied” within 
the very same body of an individual and exhibiting a “supplementary” characteristic 
for each other in everyday life, everywhere, all the time within a constant Derridian 
motion. Sex is taken to refer to biological differences (natural) whereas gender, 
considered as the real subject matter of sociology^ is taken as a construction that is 
formed socially (cultural). This can be regarded, I suggest, as a result of the deeply 
rooted nature/culture distinction that is fostered by the Cartesian rationality of 
Modernism that is invested by the hegemonic bipolarity.
Rationalities in Cartesian fashion, as I have mentioned earlier, have tended to
open distinctions between the ordered, the controlled and the abstract on the one
end, and the disordered, the uncontrolled and the concrete on the other. In our case,
the latter end, which is always implicitly discredited, covers body and bodily matters.
In recent years, with the rise in cultural studies, re-reading of Nietzsche and by the
impact of massive and widespread influence of Foucault along with the deep
questioning of modernity, the central narratives which separate mind and body and
the social sciences and physical sciences were seriously called into question (Scott and
Morgan 1993: 4). In addition to that since the last decade the ever growing impact, I
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presume, of Deconstructionist “tools and habits” of thinking, in spite of the fact 
that not being referred directly by most of the bibliographic sources within these 
fields, should be added to those stated above.
In addition to the mainstream modernist rationale, which is based on the 
distinctions drawn by an understanding of the concept of dichotomy, what has 
strengthened the western philosophical tradition of metaphysics is the mainstream 
m du s operandi of the science. As an outcome of the systematic, ordered approach that 
has operated within the cause-effect cycles of the essentialist, determinist and 
reductionist thinking in Newtonian science, the body has mostly been regarded as a 
subordination to mind (Grosz 1995: 83-101). Bryan Turner in his book Regulating 
Bodies: Essays in Medical Sociology delineates the situation by stressing that this 
state of the subordination of the body has been achieved “under an ethic world of 
mastery” (1992: 32). Today the mainstream view in the society is that the scientific is 
aligned with the truth and good, and that scientific postulates are indisputable. They 
are always on the side of the ethical, for the well being of the people, the society, the 
humanity. Science is the source of master knowledge and is the trailblazer of the 
human being that would not bounded to, or limited with the nature anymore. Science 
and technology being the major practical components of this mastery and western 
civilization, and being both the outcome and driving force of the modern rationalist 
view that stems from the obsession of innovation and progress, caused the 
problematic distinction of mind/body. However, this is the general “anomaly” that 
the technological improvements impinge on the conception of the body. In the two 
subsections below (1.3.1 and 1.3.2) I will try to demonstrate the impact of the 
various technologies by concentrating on the medical and computer technologies in 
order to exhibit the specific “illusory” powers they have. These sections should be
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considered as two offshoots; essays that aimed to demonstrate the facets of the 
above-mentioned mastery. However before that, I wish to discuss briefly how law and 
bureaucracy, the two practical tools of (political) “power” that our bodies are 
subjected, envisage the body.
1.3 Everyday Body
What has begun to emerge, as we dive into the depths of the western 
conception of body, is that we do not only have the restricted opposition of mind 
and body, but a cluster of such dichotomies. As a variation of part/whole distinction 
or to that of agency/structure, there is a separation between the individual and 
society.
It is obvious that in every field of power that “regulates” and dominates our 
everyday lives, we are confined, restricted, guided, and controlled by set of rules and 
codes. Law being the most powerful one of these codes has certainly a hold on our 
bodies and all aspects adhered to it. “There is no law that is not inscribed on bodies. 
Every law has a hold on the body” (de Certeau 1984: 139). Rationale of the state and 
bureaucracy, therefore, is to do with the surveillance and control of the bodies (cf 
Foucault’s Body). Apparently, the bureaucracies are all about the human body, dealing 
ultimately with the control of the bodies in time and space (Scott and Morgan 1993: 
16). On the other hand, strange that as it may be, patterns of bureaucratic 
recruitment, the conduct of our everyday life and the way in which it is structured by 
system of rules and a clearly defined hierarchy, actually, represent a radical denial of 
the body. “Formally”, the bureaucracy is indifferent to shapes and sizes of bodies,
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and issues of health and disability only arise where these are conceived relevant to tlie 
successful performance of the tasks.
Turner and also Scott and Morgan emphasize the need for a more concerned 
view of “everyday life” in sociology, which has been sacrificed for the sake of the 
“transcendental signified”. “Moving away from narrowly defined scientific 
knowledge, we may concern ourselves with everyday knowledge” (Scott and Morgan 
1993: 13). Turner establishes a relationship -just like an “essential supplement” in 
Derridian fashion:
In order to comprehend this everyday world, or life-world, it 
appears to me that a sociology of tlie body is a necessary condition 
for understanding everyday routines, conditions and requirements.
Everyday life is the production and reproduction of bodies; we have 
to grasp this elementary fact before we can go on to talk about the 
production of ‘the person’. (1992: 3)
Turner also points out that in order to understand social action, we need the 
conception of “social actor” to be defined by taking into account the definition of 
“the person” in the first place. The body, therefore, as a representation of 
fundamental features of society, should be envisaged as being a “lived body” (1992: 
4)*^
We are embodied creatures and our bodies inevitably constructed socially. 
Socially constructed body means that culture is a major force in this process and
What Turner implies here with the term “lived body” is different from the conception of 
the “lived body” that is discussed in chapter 3. Turner emphasizes or reminds the person as 
being the “agency” as well as being a part of the “structure”. He tries to think of the 
biological facet of the body rather than advocating psychoanalytical and phenomenological 
theories of the formation and self-reflexivity of the self For a discussion of the person as 
the agency and active part of the structure, see Pile and Thrift (1995).
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cultural context, thus, is a factor of utmost importance. Therefore, in the 
development of the self and in the constitution of the “I”, body and bodily matters 
have deserved to occupy a larger space than what has been thought before (cf. 
Freud’s Body and Lacan’s Body). Because in the identification of the social agents, 
the identification process depends fundamentally on their embodiment. As Turner 
has pointed out, our biological bodies are the primary means for our survival, not in 
the wilderness of the nature, but in the complexities of practical social interactions.
17“Gestures, handshakes, winks, salutes, attention, bending, walking” as bocl·)/ techtiiques 
“are essential for the social life. Only through successful presenting, monitoring and 
interpreting of bodies, a social life could be read and be lived through” (Turner 1992: 
15).
1.3.1 Eternalizing the Vanishing Body
Jung states that the Cartesian metaphysics whose center is the cogito is 
identifiable with the hegemony of vision (1996). Since the Cartesian mind is isolated 
and sovereign, it is the philosophy of reflection that identifies the thinking substance:
It is reflexive narcissism par excellence . .  . there is an identity between 
the 1 ’ and the ‘eye’. As the mind’s I is the mind’s eye, so the cogito is 
video ergo sum. The cogito is a scopic regime, a visual machine. (Jung 
1996: 4)
17 The term coined by Marcel Mauss. See Mauss (1979) for an early anthropological work 
that puts forth the idea of the body as a set of social practices within which the individual is 
trained, disciplined and socialized.
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In the present day, employment of high technology, that mostly “re­
presents” reality in digital environments and in the format of transformed images 
that can be manipulated and mediated, promotes the propagation of the image of 
fragmented body. Through the visualizing technologies of medicine, for instance, we 
become obsessed in knowing our bodies:
Medical authorities encourage us to monitor consumption of sugar, 
caffeine, salt, fat, cholesterol, nicotine, alcohol, steroids, sunlight, 
narcotics tlirough the use of such devices as electronic scales, home 
pregnancy kits, diabetes tests, blood pressure machines and fat 
calipers. (Balsamo 1995: 216)
All these devices function as a set of visualizing techniques that contribute to 
the perception of the body as fragmented into separate organs, fluids. We are 
accustomed to see various representations of our bodies in different formats; our 
bones, glands, teeth and internal organs on x-ray films and through the screen of 
ultrasound machine, our heartbeats on the graphical paper as the sinusoidal waves, 
our brain as colourful images on the screen of the Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
machine, and so forth. This is, I suspect, an uncanny experience.
All our organs, fluids, and the state of our body, that we neither can see nor 
detect easily, is visually represented before us. Although they are ours (they are actually 
we really do not have any direct means of control on their way of functioning. 
Yet by the help of technology make their images visible to us, we develop this
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strange, uncanny feeling of they are no more “out of sight” from our knowledge thus.
m  have the power to control and check on them 18
We all know now, how are we going to look like in the later stages of the 
disease if we got AIDS, although only few of us acquire information on the 
mechanism of the disease. The trope of medical diagnosis techniques continues as 
follows: if the technology make possible to see what we can not see with our naked 
eyes, it might make us know the remedies. Body, therefore, should be left totally to 
the capable hands of technology for being healthy, for enhancement, for h t i n g f u l^  
functional. The biotechnology is advocated as the only possible source that might 
find the remedy for the diseases like AIDS. Hence, the new biotechnologies are 
promoted as life-enhancing, and even life-saving. A human being backed by 
technology is stronger than the human being that maintains to live “naturally”.
Cyborgs for instance, represented as almost invincible in the fiction films, are 
accelerating the acceptance of technological prostheses incorporated with our bodies. 
After all, the concept of prosthesis is not an alien one altogether. We use glasses, 
hearing aids, crutches that are not incorporated with our bodies but are just 
accessories. However, on the other hand we also might have implanted teeth, added- 
on artificial limbs, transplanted organs, screwed in platinum joints, and even an 
implanted heart, which is artificial.
18 Know-your-own-body obsession manifests itself in contemporary culture in a variety of 
different but yet inter-connected ways. Practices of personal hygiene, ultimate care taken 
during (and before) having sex, precautions taken for not contaminated by diseases (ranging 
from flu to AIDS) all are taken as the signifiers of a certain culture which indicates an 
established, yet not static and ever-improving, point of view towards the body (a
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It is the natural material of the human being that is made more stronger by 
introducing “more robust” and “more durable” technological implants. Biological 
and technological “merge” into one another. The organic/natural and 
technological/cultural could now be merged relying on the reconceptualization of 
the human body as a boundary figure belonging simultaneously to both of the systems 
(Balsamo 1995; 215).
There is a crucial twist here, at this very point of the trope, fostered by 
know-your-body obsession: the material body is objectified and it is subjected to the 
discipline of normative gaze. Moreover, to draw a boundary could well be defined as 
a structuralist approach that eventually establishes a hierarchical relationship between 
culture and nature. It is the generator of the dream that human being would prevail 
in its encounters with nature: “techno-bodies” are healthy, fully functional and 
enhanced, they are more real than the real, just like to be in a cyberreal environment 
being more satisfying and pleasurable than experiencing real life.
In medicine, technologies do not only convey information about the current 
or past states of our bodies as medical diagnostics do, but, they might also offer 
images of ourselves in the future as it is the case in cosmetic surgery. The surgeon, by 
using high-tech video imaging programs, manipulates your digitized image on screen 
in order to illustrate possible surgical transformations. Your material body 
reconfigured as an electronic image is manipulated technologically on the screen 
before it is manipulated surgically in the operating room.
contaminated body then, for such a view, points the cultural identity of its bearer: an HIV 
positive person is regarded either as an homosexual or drug user, or both).
45
The body is promised to be eternalized by technology, the more we rely on 
the scientific and technological products, it is imposed on us, the more chance and 
power we have in controlling our vanishing, weak, poor bodies.
1.3.2 Abandoning the Vanishing Body
The fascinating, magical -and also invading and compelling- realm of 
cyberreal could only be experienced personally and almost fully, apart from other 
electronic and digital equipment, via what is generally called computer, i.e. PC 
(I^ersonal Computers). The concept and also the physical materiality of the “PC” -  
although sometimes maintain a discrete profile— is the sine qua non element in the 
whole debate hinges on the discourse dealing with all concepts and states defined 
with a prefix cyber.* .^
In contemporary western societies majority of people relies on various forms 
of technology during their everyday lives. As Deborah Lupton states, many of the 
technological artefacts are used to “construct a sense of subjectivity and 
differentiation from others (the car being an obvious example)” (1995: 98). 
Nevertheless, the relation with the PC has peculiarities that put it apart from the 
many other technological artefacts we employ. For a growing number of people, PCs 
are in a way “special” artefacts to which they feel strong “dependency” and reliance. 
We employ PCs for work, entertainment or communication purposes with constantly
19 Cyber is from Greek kuhernan, which means to steer, to guide, and to govern.
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increasing hours and frequency of use. Instances like network breakdowns or system 
deficiencies demonstrate how closely and intensely we are dependent on PCs; we 
usually react with expressions and exclamations of shock and panic as if we have 
injured badly or, more strikingly, lost an organ or limb of our bodies. Despite the 
dependency, many people who use their PCs almost everyday have very little 
knowledge of how these “marvellous” machines work. Hence, the unquestioned, 
unequivocal trust and dependency are combined with mystique. Michael Heim 
commented on our relation with PCs as follows:
Our love affair with computers, computer graphics, and computer 
networks runs deeper than aesthetic fascination and deeper than the 
play of senses. We are searching for a home for the mind and the 
heart. Our fascination with computers is more erotic than sensuous, 
more deeply spiritual than utilitarian. (1991: 61)
There is no other technological artefact, it seems for today, that is loaded 
with cultural meanings and antliropomorphism like PC. Although some technological 
products —like cars— are often referred as human-like by investing them emotional 
and personality attributes, PCs are represented as “friends”, work “companions” and 
even “lovers” (Lupton 1995: 98). PCs are more than an “object”, yet not internalized 
fully by the “subject” as an organ either. Lupton, by referring to Grosz, asserts that:
. . . rather tlian the computer/human dyad being a simple matter of 
self versus other, there is, for many people, a blurring of the 
boundaries between the embodied self and the PC. (1995: 99)
When an inanimate tool, Lupton asserts, is used too long, touched and on 
the body for long enough, they become extensions of the body image and sensation. 
However, they are not internalized by the person no matter even if they are 
psychically invested into the self They become an interface, an intermediate, a 
“midway between the inanimate and the bodily” to quote Grosz (1994: 81). Thus,
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users employ technological artefacts symbiotically as contributing to their own 
images, as their selves and their bodies.
The mind/body dichotomy fostered by the “idealised” state of cyber worth 
to mention at this point. Cyberpunk literature, for instance, often implies, and 
sometimes explicitly promotes, the possibility of being liberated from the body 
(Featherstone and Burrows 1995: 10). Needless to mention, this is offered by 
computers. In cyberwriting the human body is referred as the “meat”, the burden that 
surrounds the mind, slows down the limitless capabilities of it, obstructs its freedom 
and mobility, its proper functioning by which the “authentic” self could be reached 
(Lupton 1995: 100). The (post)modernized version of Descartes’s view “the body as 
machine” which comes forth as the metaphor of “human as computer” has an 
important part here. The irrationality of embodiment is denied. Human brains are 
described as “organic computers” which represents the human thought as rational, 
intentional, “suppressing other cultural meanings around thought processes and 
unconscious” (Featherstone and Burrows 1995: 11). It is to declare rejection of the 
mental processes like dreaming, wishing, joking and even speech.
A “cyberfan” and/or a computer nerd would ask: Why one should be 
compelled by a bo^  (earthly, weak, irrational, passive, dirty) with limited capacity in 
terms of satisfying the needs of the mind (spiritual, rational, abstract, active, clean)? 
The body, for the nerd disrupts the user every now and then with its demands to be 
fulfilled; it needs nourishment, cleaning, resting, maintenance and so on (Lupton 
1995: 100-1). The human being, in various ways in “cyberwriting”, is considered as an 
organic entity that ultimately must leave the “meat” behind and reach the state where 
its idealized virtual body does not eat, drink, urinate, get tired, become ill, even it 
does not die (Lupton 1995: 111).
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The body of stereotypical cyborg that has been represented in the world of 
cyberpunk almost exemplifies the state of the body, which a stereotypical cyberfan 
would die to have. A cyborg (iy^ernetic o;jganism) is where the biological and 
technological merges, or to be more precise where the computer technology and the 
human flesh melds together. The body of cyborgs such as the ones represented in 
the movies Blade Runner. Terminator, Robocop depict the body of the cyborg as far 
stronger than the human body, far “less susceptible to injury or pain” (Featherstone 
and Burrows 1995: 4). They could even repair themselves and remain not effected -  
neither emotionally nor physically- by the surgery, thus they are almost un- 
intimidateable. The cyborg body is super and admirable; the boundaries of its body 
are clean; it is hard, its form is tight: it is invulnerable.
The mythology of the bodies that are “addicted” to PCs has certain 
convictions according to Lupton. In contrast to the cyborg body which is 
uncontaminated, clean and with well defined boundaries of “inside” and “outside” 
(which is to say the feeling of abjection could be avoided in a cyborgian body), the 
computer nerd’s body has characteristics which is “absolutely unattractive, and even, 
disgusting” (Lupton 1995: 103). On the other hand, hackers and computer nerds are 
generally represented as “computer whizzes” who are admired for their intellectual 
capacities and abilities (that is, for their “brain” or ability of deciphering software)^°. 
They are represented in popular culture as predominantly male, in their early 
adulthood and portrayed as social misfits. Lupton observes that their physical
20 The meaning and pronunciation of the term “whiz” is somehow similar to that of the 
word “wiz” which is derived from Wi^ a^rd o f 0^. A description which is very apt for the 
image of the computer world; magical, miraculous, mysterious and mystical.
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appearance is usually depicted as pale, overweighed, wearing thick glasses, dressed in 
a poor fashion sense and in dirty clothes. Their bodies are “soft” and evoke abjection 
(i.e., degraded, and despicable, contemptible). They are represented as incapable of 
communicating with other people in face-to-face contact^': they are obsessed with 
computer because of their asocial attitudes and physical unattractiveness. They are 
regarded as computer-addicts as if they are some kind of drug-addicts.
Thus they lack control over their bodies and its desires, it is definitely the 
opposite of the cyborgian body that is rationalized and contained. They do not want 
to eternalize their body as it is offered by the medical technologies, but instead, they 
want to abandon the body that is uncontrollable and unordered as it is again, 
vanishing, weak, and poor.
1.4 The “Two” Sides of the Möbius Strip
Within the theoretical field of twentieth century’s terrain of thought, 
according to recent studies, there have been two kinds of broad approach to the 
body, which can be named as the lived body and the inscriptive body in a generalizing 
attempt, or, as the British mostly prefer to name them, the naturalistic body and the 
socially constructed body (Levin 1989, Shilling 1993, Grosz 1994, 1995, Turner 1992, 
1994, 1996).
21 Face-to-face contact -  speech. Perhaps they represent one of the facets of the 
subordinated “writing” within the society.
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However, Nick Crossley (1996) opposes to the idea that such a division is 
forming in the social theory of the body, and tries to exemplify his view in his study 
in which he compares the views of Foucault to those of Merleau-Ponty’s. I believe 
on the one hand, he is right in saying that the two views are mutually informing and 
complementary, yet on the other he is not, in asserting that the two views are 
propagated by the above-mentioned authors as in opposition to one another. Elizabeth 
Grosz, for instance, states clearly that she “doubts that the two models are 
reconcilable” (1994: 27). Yet, by that she does not mean only one of the models can 
bear the potential of being valid for a whole range of problems concerning the 
human embodiment, and the body. Grosz, moreover, being well aware of the binary 
oppositions and their limited and illusory effects, asserts that somehow a theory of 
the body should be achieved —and she tries to explore a new path focusing on the 
sexual difference. All throughout her studies she demonstrates both the strong and 
weak points of each model and she looks for another way that may utilize certain 
views from each of them. The other authors mentioned above have shared similar 
affirmative views throughout their studies in which they have chosen to accentuate 
various facets of the human embodiment.
The lived body and inscriptive body “models” are named relatively: according 
to their relative point of view toward the human body. I will follow Grosz’s 
approach, primarily for the sake of practicality and without being uncautious. Firstly, 
as grouping would help us to understand the premise of the approaches with an 
affinity more clearly. Secondly, as the views that are brought together in a certain 
model exhibit a valid degree of coherence up to an extent, which is relatively stronger 
with respect to the other views in the other model, it is possible to detect the major 
forces effecting the bodies tlirough generalizing. Although this has its own risks, as
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someone new in the field it is a must for me to start from the more general in order 
to proceed to the more refined with conviction.
Firstly, I will attempt to depict both of the models with respect to their 
broader concerns, and then, exemplify them in greater detail by conveying the 
conceptions of some of the prominent figures, as they are usually referred as the 
major contributors within these fields. Secondly, in the conclusion chapter, I will 
modestly, yet in an implicit and freer fashion, attempt to reconcile the conceptions 
and approaches from both of the philosophies via some concepts of deconstruction 
that I have tried to convey up to here, since I believe the two models are nothing but 
the two different lines drawn on the Möbius strip which has not two separate 
surfaces, but one.
The two broad approaches that I will separately discuss below, therefore, 
should not be considered as opposed to each other, but rather as a shift in the 
emphasis in two “different” directions with the focal point remained same. They are 
grouped only with reference to the relative positioning, relative point of view of their 
approach to the body. It is always possible to detect the “traces” of the “opposite” 
approach in each other.
Lastly, I feel an itchy urgency to explain a point regarding the Möbius strip 
metaphor I have used earlier while discussing deconstruction. I have conceived it on 
my own in a paper in 1996, and at that time I was totally unaware of the fact that it 
has already been employed as a metaphor by well known scholars such as Lacan, 
Lyotard, and particularly Grosz (surprisingly in her writings on the body). This 
creates an ambivalence feeling: I am both flattered and discouraged.
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Nevertheless, the this-has-been-done-before situation is not something new 
in the academia (as well as in art, science and philosophy). However, having explained 
my reasons, I feel quite free to employ it in my own way without referring to 
someone else.
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2 The Body from within Outside
The body that is conceived as to evolve “from within outside” implies a 
direction as well as a process. Yet, neither the process nor the direction of the 
evolution is that simple and uniform, or unidirectional and unilateral. The process 
can only be “completed”, or be ready for “regeneration” when it returns to its 
starting phase. This evolution cycle, hence, may only occur when the progressive 
direction of it circles back. The direction is, initially, away from outside toward inside, 
from exterior to interior. Nevertheless, it is eventually reflected back —yet, perhaps 
partially— as to complete the cycle. It is the relative standing point (of view), therefore, 
of the advocates of this model that provoke them to emphasixe the starting point, 
i.e., the outside of the body. It seems to me there is no decidable starting point for the 
cause-effect relationship (like a chain-reaction) of the segments of a topologically 
closed cycle. That is why the title of this subsection is “from within outside”, and not 
simply “from outside” or “from exterior to interior” as these imply a termination, a 
one-way journey. The title, I believe, implies more aptly the complexity of cycling 
motion, the partiality of it within the Möbius strip, the relativity of the starting point.
The initial direction of the evolution of the body as such is from its outer 
surface to its inner depths. This is due to the set of forces that are capable of shaping 
and forming the body, and the subject. The body as such has a “skin”; an outer 
surface, which is a sensitive target for the forces, primarily exerted from outer 
sources. The conception of such a body as the “surface of inscription”
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predominantly stems from a prevailing concern with the sociopolitical issues and 
problems. The body that is analyzed within this view is a “social” body, the body that 
is subjected to social norms, legislative laws, moral and cultural values. It is the body 
within the public, among the other “bodies”; the body that is primarily and constantly 
exposed to external “forces”  ^ These forces, and particularly when they are emitted 
by the sources of power, simultaneously exert concrete and imaginary constraints and 
sanctions on the body and, henceforth consequently, on the conception of the body. 
That is meant to say, they both exercise on the materiality, the physicality, and the 
“surface” of the body, and -as a subsequence of this incision according to the 
rationale of this approach- the psyche, and the “interiority” of the body. The outer 
surface of the body that is inscribed by the exterior “forces” generates the interiority. 
The body’s surface as such folds back on itself and produces, shapes the interior 
depth and core, i.e., the subject. Grosz comments on the principal engagement of the 
inscriptive approach as follows:
The inscriptive model is more concerned [than that of the “lived 
body” model] with the processes by which the subject is marked, 
scarred, transformed, and written upon or constructed by the 
various regimes of institutional, discursive, and nondiscursive power 
as a particular kind of body (Grosz 1995: 33).
We are, encountered here with the subject conceived as a “surface 
phenomenon”. It is the inseparable surface of human corporeality (and whatever is
Actually, these forces are not always necessarily to be understood as radiated by 
Foucauldian crystallit^ed sources of pomr, as for among them are die “other” bodies and 
objects which may exercise on the body “positively” as much possibly as “negatively”. 
Foucauldian power, whereas, always “acts” as an agent of oppression, and is generated by the 
discourses that consider, eventually, the masses: the society. Please refer to the subsection 
below tided as Foucault’s Body.
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“written upon” it); the carnal and earthly existence of the “natural” human being 
which is conceived as a target, and which is considered somewhat as pliable and 
docile; that draws the boundaries of subjectivity^. The advocates of this model 
accept that the body as such is not only shaped and constrained, but even invented by 
the society also. The common point within the internal varieties of this model is that 
the social forces impinge upon the body: yet, there are diverse views on the 
formulation of these forces and on the question of how they affect the body.
The susceptible, receptive subject as such, thus apparently, is not “living” 
alone. The subject’s body has a “sensitive skin”. It contacts, through its “surface”, 
with other “bodies” and surfaces. Its body, is “a series of linkages (or possibly 
activities) which form superficial or provisional connections with other objects and 
processes” (Grosz 1995: 116).
The metaphor of body-as-surface, within this particular discourse, advocates 
the use of a series of others. The body as a tabula rasa, a page, a flat-plane, a material 
surface; which is inscribed, marked, scarred, written upon by instruments such as 
stylus, laser beam, clothing, accessory, diet, exercise; can, therefore, also be read and 
interpreted. The body becomes a text, a book, an emblem, a badge which becomes 
the bearer of messages, signs, meanings; and a medium which can transmit them as 
well as receive them (Grosz 1994: 115-21). The embodied subjectivity as such, thus, is
For an epitomized and well-represented discussion on the body and its relation with the 
subjectivity, see The Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, and Space. Time, and 
Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies, both by Elizabeth Grosz. Full bibliographic 
details are given in the Works Cited section. These two works, being very “inspirational” for 
me, actually guided my thoughts whilst constituting the theoretical framework of this part of 
the study.
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theorized not with the questions of what/how it “feels”, but rather with the 
questions of what it “does”, and how it “acts”.
In order to map the conceptualization of the human body as a social 
construction, as a surface incised and inscribed by the social forces, the situation of 
the embodied subject, in this respect, within the society should be examined. The 
situated subject as such has been a serious concern, in varying modes and degrees, for 
the figures whom I have taken as the major representatives of this model, namely, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze-and-Felix Guattari. 
Surprising as it may be, none of them actually has a coherent theory of the body. Yet, 
in their works there is considerable, and useful, theoretical reflections on the body, 
which have been referred frequently by the scholars writing on the body and related 
issues. All of the accounts briefly and broadly touched below share a common 
ground; they are all opposed to the notion that the body is only a closed, object-like, 
physiological system.
Needless to say, it is not possible for me to exhibit their reflections and 
conceptions of the body in full, nor in relation to the depths of the specific 
philosophical accounts of each of them. I will try, however even if briefly and 
occasionally, to mention their general philosophical “characteristic” and the points 
that they are said to either share or break apart. Since my aim in this part of the work 
is to trace the philosophical conceptions on the body (that have influenced the recent 
social theories), I believe, a subsection devoted to each of these figures will be 
appropriate in terms of illustrating the most remarkable points of this approach.
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2.1 Nietzsche’s Body
Bodj I am entirely and twthing else: the soul is only a m rd  fo r
something about the bo^^.
The body, for Nietzsche, is a battlefield. Yet, the combats that take place in 
this field, rather than being destructive, are productive and positive“*. The body, which 
Nietzsche conceives, in the first instance, is chaotic, energetic, mercurial, tactile, wild 
and demanding. As such it is, for being the nest and target for multiple forces. More 
than that, it, verily, is made up of this multiplicity of forces; again for it is not only 
the site of these ever-conflicting and ever-contesting forces which never cease to 
clash, but also the source of them.
Before plunging into the delineation of tliese forces and of how they relate 
to the body, however, I infer that it would be appropriate to enter upon Nietzsche’s 
incessant quest -o f will, knowledge, power, and truth- and critique of modernity. 
Appropriate it would be, for the reason that his quest, as I tend to see, is discerning, 
not only with regard to the issues related to die body, but, correlatively in a larger
 ^Friedrich Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
4 In the majority of the works cited in this thesis, Nietzsche is always among the references 
with which one would fairly, yet consistently encounter. Despite some unfavourable views, 
the prevailing final account on his conception of the body —and also on his philosophy in 
general — is that it is affirmative and enhancing, be that as he may be rigorous and 
disparaging on certain aspects of modern culture (see Grosz 1994 and 1995, Hughes 1996, 
Lash 1991).
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scale, connected with the general discourses of knowledge and truth of the western 
modernity^, also.
In his rigorous critique of the modern culture and thought of his times (i.e., 
nineteenth century), Nietzsche’s primary concerns are, if I should generalize 
following Bill Hughes, “the idols of modernity” (Hughes 1996: 33). What are these 
idols for which Nietzsche manifests his contempt so vigorously? He condemns 
whatever he sees as an illusory idol -which is always authoritarian and governing: 
despotic laws, suppressive Christian morality, absolute reason and mind, sheer 
consciousness, de-somatized philosophy, tamed desire and will, codified customs, and 
alike. Nietzsche, in short, is against, I propose, whatever bisects, and for, in all the 
diverse meanings of the word, the just, concerning the human being/life that he 
conceives as a complex set of multiple interactions. His endeavour, thus, is to 
resuscitate the subordinated terms that are suffocated within the abyss of 
dichotomous thought. Yet, his is not a vulgar, reductionist approach nor a simple 
attempt to reverse the hierarchy of the pairs of the dualism. He is after a more 
“natural”, balanced and fair view of the human “culture” and the world. Within this 
context of his philosophical condemnation of modernity, Nietzsche’s major issues in 
which he employs questions of the body^ evolve around two main axes, or contexts;
Nietzsche has remarkably been cited in various critical works on western culture in which 
post-Cartesian (be it poststructuralist, postmodernist, postcolonialist, deconstructionist) 
epistemology and mediodologies are employed. For some, thus, he is the trailblazer of the 
detour to the dichotomous mode of thought. Hughes claims, for instance, that Foucault, 
Battaille, Deleuze, Derrida “owe a debt to Nietzsche” (Hughes 1996: 43n2).
 ^ Nietzsche never specifically worked on a theory of the body. He has no such coherent 
theory in terms of the body, although the body and the closely related issues to it always 
inscribed on “almost every page he has written.”
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the theory of knowledge (epistemology), and power (particularly the will to power). 
In the paragraphs below, the reader will find Nietzsche’s underlying, intricate critique 
of social inhibitions which, not only inscribe the body, but, strive to impair its will to 
overcome itself, its movement of becoming, also.
Nietzsche sees the body as the long-neglected, overlooked (even repressed 
and, thus, forgotten in a more “conscious” manner ) “reality”. He believes affects, 
passion and desire in particular, that are mainly emanated from the body must be 
revived, reinstated in opposition to the metaphysically magnified conceptions of 
reason, mind, truth, and consciousness*.
Ideas are rooted in interests and desire, which have their location in 
our physiological selves. Ideas, concepts, knowledge, truth are 
simply, essentially, a consequence of our need to know, a rhetorical 
canopy that we wrap around ourselves to create a place of safety in 
a confusing and harsh world. (Hughes 1996: 34)
Desire to know and will to power, for Nietzsche, are the primary motivations 
for us to operate and rely on, what we call our reason and mind. We consider the 
mind as superior because we “feel” better and safe, i.e., “powerful”, as we believe that 
we acquire more “knowledge” by using the faculties of mind, which supposedly 
reveals the “truth”. For Nietzsche, this sequence does not prove the principality of
7 .The Nietzschean definition of epistemology always strive to balance the "‘mind’’ (reason, 
conscious) and the “body” (organic): “The body, as feeling, passion, pain, love, laughter, and 
contempt is hammered on to the anvil of intellect and the intellect is given its place in life 
alongside -not above- the faculties and capacities of the organism” (Hughes 1996: 32).
8 He is, for sure, not against reason, knowledge, truth and consciousness categorically. “For 
Nietzsche, consciousness is a belief, an illusion: . . . [yet] useful for life, a convenient fiction . 
. (Grosz 1994: 124). For Nietzsche, “. . . knowledge has survival value, rather than truth 
value” (127). He wrote “. . . truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life 
could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive” (Quoted in Grosz 1994: 127).
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mind, but, on the contrary, the principality of the bodily desire', that of will, and 
eventually, that of the will to power.
The movement of the body’s forces; the body’s struggle to overcome itself, 
to grow; its will of self-expansion, self-overcoming, all are due to affects and desires 
of the body. Accordingly what we call mistakenly as intellectual knowledge —that is 
supposedly acquired solely by mind and reason— is only a consequence of this will to 
power that is primarily corporeal. “Bodies construct systems of belief, knowledge, as 
a consequence of the impulses of their organs and processes” (Grosz 1994: 126).
Truth, on the other hand, for Nietzsche, as the privileged object of tlie 
knowledges, is ultimately dependent on the language, and thus, it is not only dynamic 
and dependent on the multiplicity of perspectives, but also, just a set of illusory 
metaphors: “What is truth but a mobile army of metaphors?” writes Nietzsche 
(quoted in Grosz 1994: 126). For Nietzsche the human body is the site where “the 
organic is rising yet to higher levels” (quoted in Grosz 1994: 128). The multiplicity of 
forces on/of it does not allow the subject to remain as singular and unified. The 
body is in a constant stage and struggle of becoming. Therewith the subject is 
incapable to grasp all; the corporeal subject cannot comprehend anything in its 
totality. There is, therefore Grosz points out, no fixed truth but perspectives: “The 
body itself . . . comes to have a perspective and position, one among a number of 
competing, or complementary, perspectives vying for ascendancy” (1994: 129).
Nietzsche brings forth, desire, will, passion, instinct, and, hence, as they all
emanate from it, the body; the energies, forces of the carnality and corporeality of
human being. Nietzsche embraces the human life (and philosophy) as comprising the
whole; with all feelings, instincts, passions, and desires -in  short, the affects— adhered
to it. Thus, to know is not for the sake of mind, but for the welfare of the bodily,
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earthly desires. “Our lust for knowledge of nature is a means through which the 
body desires to perfect itself,” wrote Nietzsche (quoted in Hughes 1996: 37).
He has developed a “naturalistic epistemology” in which the body, and the 
forces, energies, movements of becoming, on/of it are vital. It is by the effect of 
these forces that the body is constructed, and the limits of the subjectivity are drawn. 
The body, truly, is made up of these forces, yet, the question of “how” remains.
In order to be able to answer the above-mentioned question, for Nietzsche, 
one should focus on, again, the body itself and the multiple forces of incision on/of 
it. The body simultaneously encloses conflicting, competing, and contradictory 
forces, i.e., active and reactive forces. It, also, textualizes the tangible and the intangible; 
the earthly and the heavenly; the ethereal and the palpable. Yet, the affects that are 
imprisoned and inhibited by the modern culture -Nietzsche has already defined his 
times as “the decadence”—, by the constraints of social norms and rules, are the raison 
d ’être of the struggle between major forces:
Indeed, for Nietzsche, all of inner psychical life is essentially an 
excursus, a cultural product of the inhibited body, the body turned 
inward against itself, the body denied creative space and the 
possibility for self-overcoming tlirough constitutive activity. The 
products of contemplation -beliefs, values, moral systems, 
knowledge, (so-called) truths, soul- are the outcomes of the 
multiple inhibitions which structure social space and ameliorate 
desire. (Hughes 1996: 37)
The forces, are the affects of the body which produces and emits tliem; 
which forms, p er  se, tlie social values and meanings via them; and then, they are 
reflected, bounced back onto the body, by the social inhibitions; yet in “mutated” 
forms and clash with the affects. This is the crux of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
account on the body; the body, hence the subjectivity as such, is an indecisive
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singularity, is a constant movement of becoming: the subject in limbo, which 
Nietzsche strives to pull to the terrain of “superhumanity”.
Nietzsche divides the chaotic forces on/of the body that impose a 
perspective (or perspectives) into two: dominant, active forces, and subordinated, 
reactive forces. Active forces concern for their well being and expansion, whereas the 
main concern of reactive forces is active forces which they try to “internalize” or 
“domesticize” by denying and converting them against themselves. Gilles Deleuze, in 
his book Nietzsche and Philosophy, expounds the characteristics of these forces by 
describing what they “do”:
. . . reactive force is: 1) utilitarian force of adaptation and partial 
limitation; 2) force which separates active force from what it can do, 
which denies active force . . .  ; 3) force separated from what it can 
do, which denies or turns against itself . . .  And, analogously, active 
force is: 1) plastic, dominant and subjugating force; 2) force which 
goes to the limit of what it can do; 3) force which affirms its 
difference, which makes its difference an object of enjoyment and 
affirmation. Forces are only concretely and completely determined 
if these three pairs of characteristics are taken into account 
simultaneously. (Deleuze 1983: 57)
For Nietzsche, accordingly, consciousness, de-somatized philosophy, truths 
valid for all, beliefs of unity and origin, unequivocal self-reflexive reason, absolute 
knowledge of mind, all are the effects of the reactive forces, which strive to govern 
the body and the active forces on/of it that are self-expansive, self-overcoming^. The
Nietzsche believes that if philosophy -knowledge of knowledges- can see this constant 
dynamic struggle between these forces, tlien and only then it is possible for it to develop an 
affirmative, “vigorous, free, joyful activity”, since philosophy is not “a reflection on things . . 
. from a transcendent position; it is a practice that does things, legitimatizing and challenging 
other practices, enabling things to happen or preventing them from occurring” (Grosz 1994: 
126).
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impulse of these forces —the noble impulse of the active force, and the slavish 
impulse of the reactive force- can be detected by focusing on certain figures within 
the society. Grosz points out that Nietzsche, thus, has gone far enough to personify 
these forces “through the figures of the aristocratic noble and the base slave” (1994: 
129). Yet these impulses are, for him, equally possible to be exhibited by all 
individuals regardless of their social class and stratum. The noble impulse is 
disconnected, independent, looks only to the future, without fear, forgetful, dynamic, 
celebratory; whereas the slavish impulse is reactive, resentful, revengeful, full of 
hatred, only looks to the past, not tolerant to difference or to other, against to what is 
“not itself’, devious, deceptive, indirect, bounded by the limits of the memory 
(Grosz 1994: 130). The noble impulse, therefore, is best illustrated by “the artist, the 
noble, and the sovereign individual”, whereas the best examples for the slavish 
impulse are, “the priest, the nihilist, and the philosopher”.
Since to comprehend Nietzsche on this subject matter is crucial, as it forms 
an historical-conceptual base for the following approaches mentioned below, I have 
tried to keep this subsection as concise yet as dense as possible. In the succeeding 
section, I will refer to the Nietzschean conception of the body along with furtlier 
details of it. I now intend to proceed to Michel Foucault who has focused on the 
body as an investment site of the “power”.
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2.2 Foucault’s Body
The soul is the prison o f  the bodf10
Foucault’s interest is more heavily focused on the sociopolitical, 
sociohistorical issues, and their effects on the corporeality, on the body. Foucault is 
much less concerned in the questions of the subject’s psychological interior, or in the 
composition and constitution of the internal functioning, or the phenomenology of 
the body. For Foucault, the task of his genealogical studies, in terms of the body, is 
“to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the processes of history’s 
destruction of the body” (quoted in Grosz 1994: 146).
Foucault has chosen a different route from that of Nietzsche’s, although he 
has followed Nietzsche’s genealogical procedure** and kept on elaborating some of 
the latter’s major concerns which are, in our case, knowledge, power, and the body , 
on them which he has developed and used a different set of conceptions. Since, even
10
11
Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison.
"‘Genealogy is a history of events, here understood as discrete, disparate, often randomly 
connected material conjunctions of things or processes. Genealogy makes no presumptions 
about the metaphysical origins of things, their final teleology, the continuity or discontinuity 
of temporally contiguous elements, or the casual, explanatory connections between events. 
Instead, genealogy can be seen as the study of elements insofar as they are already 
interpreted, a study aimed at unsettling established models of knowledge and epistemological 
presumptions involved in the production of history, philosophy, and morality” (Grosz 1994: 
145).
12 . .As it is usually emphasized, for one, when trying to extract Foucault’s understanding of 
the body from his works, it is a sine qua non to study his conceptions of knowledge and 
power, as his construction of these concepts are tightly intertwined with the human body 
and subjectivity. He has likewise Nietzsche, no specific and coherent theory of the body, yet, 
he is referring the body from further away than Nietzsche. He is rather merely “using” the 
body as a tool in his works, in which he theorizes on the issues of sociohistorical accounts.
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if concisely, I have tried to delineate Nietzsche’s philosophy on these conceptions, I 
believe, for tlie sake of practicality and economy, it would be appropriate to try to 
expound those of Foucault’s with respect to the former.
For Foucault, the body is more like the object, target, and instrument of 
power, and, certainly more passive, docile and pliable in comparison to that of 
Nietzsche’s. Foucault’s body is the privileged site of investment(s) of power. Power 
utilizes the subject’s (thus, the body’s) desires and pleasures to create knowledges and 
truths. It does not only passively utilize them, but actually also, produces them. These 
knowledges and truths are, in their turn as Grosz puts it, used within a vicious circle 
to develop more “refined, improved, and efficient techniques for the surveillance and 
control of the bodies” (1994: 146).
For Nietzsche, the knowledges, which are developed as illusions (i.e., they 
have a survival value rather than truth value), and their formation, are due to the 
repressed, forgotten desires of the body; they are the product of the body, whereas for 
Foucault the knowledge-body relation is significantly different. Foucault’s body is, 
despite being the plantation field of them, primarily a site on which knowledges and 
powers are exercised, and through which they function. Thus, although being 
resistant up to some extent, Foucault’s body is more like an investment site of the 
knowledges and powers. This is so, for the fact that Foucault sees knowledge as a 
social product, in contra to Nietzsche’s “naturalistic epistemology” which has its 
roots nowhere else, but in the body and in its “forgetfulness”. For the former, 
“knowledge and truth are what a particular culture counts as true, what functions as
6 6
true” (Grosz 1994; 147). The knowledge and truth, moreover, are always 
accompanied by institutions that develop and propagate their discourses. Therefore, I 
believe, Foucault’s concerns -o f knowledge, power , the body— are more pragmatic 
and sociohistorical, rather than ontological. In accordance to that, his understanding 
of the body differs significantly from that of Nietzsche’s. His conception of the 
functioning of the body is close to that of a “black box”. He is not, in fact, much 
interested in the consciousness and the Nietzschean forces (active-reactive) that are 
somehow adhered to the subject’s “natural” corporeality. The resistance of the body; 
for Nietzsche, is due to its “internal” energies, intensities, and the impetus of its 
forces; whereas for Foucault, it is rather due to its recalcitrance stemmed from its 
location and context with respect to the discourses. The definition of the resistant 
body in Foucault is as much problematic as his conception of the bodily pleasures 
and desires, since he never provided an explicit theoretical delineation of them. This 
is said to be for the reasons that Foucault actually reproduced the hegemonic- 
dualistic approach by overemphasizing “discourses” as to diminish the fact of the 
phenomenological body. For him, the powers of the body seem to be limited to those 
invested in them by discourses. Similarly, “he cannot say what it is about the body 
that resists” (Shilling 1993: 81). There is considerable critique of Foucault revolving
13 For Foucault, power is not something, which can simply be defined and detected. It must 
be understood '‘as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them; as the support these 
force relations find in another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the 
strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is 
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social 
hegemonies’" (Foucault 1978: 92).
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around the weaknesses of him on the above mentioned points (see, Falk 1994, 
Shilling 1993, Turner 1996).
Power and knowledge, in Foucauldian view, are synergetic. Power produces 
knowledge for the sake of revealing the truth that, in its turn, exalts knowledge to an 
indisputable, unequivocal position, in order to enable the power to use it as a tool to 
seize hold of the bodies. Foucault posits the body within the dynamic nexus of 
power-knowledge as follows:
The body is moulded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken 
down by the rhythms of work, rest and holidays; it is poisoned by 
food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs 
resistances . . . .  Nothing in man -not even his body— is sufficiently 
stable to serve as a basis of self-recognition or for understanding 
other men. (Quoted in Grosz 1994: 148)
Power, therefore, constructs an “efficient”, “predictable”, “controllable” 
subject through its body, that is moulded to produce a susceptible, docile, and thus, 
obedient subject. Yet, the gist of the matter is that the body as such is not stable and 
recognizable for tlie subject, but for the powers of the discourses. The subject as 
such has a determinate body, “with particular features, skills, and attributes.” This is 
why the epigram in the beginning of this subsection, I believe, exemplifies at best 
Foucault’s conception of the body in the way that it is determined in modernity. 
Power produces a subject with a “soul”, interiority through the incised, inscribed 
body, which, consequently, becomes the “prison” of the body. The subject, in 
accordance to that, is shaped and moulded, not by coercive, brutal methodologies, 
but through discourses via its body that is then considered (in modernity) as the 
“mindful body”. Chris Shilling, yet, points out that the body is not “simply a focus of 
discourse”, but it constitutes “the link between daily practices on the one hand and 
the large scale organization of power on the other” (Shilling 1993: 75). The power,
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writes Foucault, thus, operates “through progressively finer channels, gaining access 
to individuals themselves, to their bodies, their gestures and all their daily actions” 
(quoted in Shilling 1993: 75).
Foucault employed the issues of the body, in a great extent, in his works on 
the disciplinary systems and the history of sexuality. He has traced the individual’s 
trajectory, within a transition from traditional to modern society, and in the context 
of its construction as the embodied subject connected to institutions. What seems, to 
me, as the most significant change in this transition is the shift in the conception of 
the body; the “fleshy body” is replaced by the “mindful body” which is conceived as 
the —(ab)usable, pliable— site of a multiplicity of intentions, desires, and 
“consciousness” by the Foucauldian power..
Foucault’s famous analysis of Benthamite Panopticon constitutes a 
convenient example in terms of displaying the relations of the body-knowledge to 
the space that is dominated by discourses of power*"*. The Panopticonist philosophy 
is concerned not only with observation and with surveillance, but also, with the 
individuation and the stimulation of desires. “Individuation is a set of practices by 
which individuals are identified and separated by marks, numbers, signs and codes 
which are derived from knowledge of the population and related to the establishment 
of norms” (Shilling 1993: 78). The scope of control, accordingly, has been changed 
as to be exerted over much larger areas of society since it is divided into classified, 
standardized groups.
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As the philosophy of the Panopticon model was applied to most of the 
institutions^^ where tlie power is most crystallized; two major shifts occurred in terms 
of control mechanism. The first is the shift from the control of a centralized 
authority to a mechanism of self-control The awareness of surveillance, knowing that 
an overseer exists, becomes the source of an exerted stimulation for subjects to 
develop self-control over their bodies and behaviour. The second shift, which is 
symbiotic with and complementary to the first one, is about the means of controlling. 
The repressive, restrictive means of controlling, is largely replaced with ‘‘an increased 
focus on maintaining control through the stimulation of desires'' (Shilling 1993: 80).
14 The Panopticon was a circular building of cells where prisoners were always available for 
surveillance from a central watchtower. . . . under the constant gaze of an overseer. . . '' 
(Shilling 1993: 75).
15 It is the Panoptic model today, the model of the modern prison, which is extended, not 
only, into institutions like schools, army barracks, hospitals, as Foucault observed, but, I 
believe, into the characteristic spaces of the capitalist discourse, also; work places, hotel 
lobbies, shopping malls.
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2.3 Deleuze-and-Guattari’s Body
Tbe BipO is 7ieveryours or mine. It is always a body. 16
Gilles Deleuze, like Nietzsche and Foucault, did not specifically work to 
develop a theory of the body. The questions of the body, particularly those posited 
by Spinoza, which influenced Deleuze in his early works'^ have evolved to give rise to 
some of the major concepts that he delivered with Félix Guattari in later works. The 
premises of that Deleuze (with Guattari) is included in this section (i.e.. The Body 
from within Outside) differs from those of Nietzsche’s and/or Foucault’s. Deleuze’s 
philosophy has a peculiar trajectory, which can be broadly described as to evolve 
from the realm of ontology towards ethics and to politics (Flardt 1993: xx). The 
conception of the body of Deleuze and Guattari, accordingly, has offshoots from 
and toward each of these fields: It travels back and forth; it is in between and in 
relation both to the ontology, the ethics, and the politics of the body or bodies.
I will primarily conceive this subsection from their last co-works. I am going 
to be highly selective in terms of using their concepts and approaches which most of 
them will be from the volumes of their co-authored work Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, that are, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus*^ .
16
17
Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus.
See Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy by Michael Hardt, particularly 
chapter 3.
18 All of the authors tliat I have cited or read for this subsection have practiced and 
recommended a ‘'different/patient/freer'* way of reading -and also using- Deleuze’s 
thoughts. See Hardt (xvii-xxi), Grosz (1994: 165-66), Massumi (7-8). See also Deleuze and
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In the first chapter, I have tried to convey Derrida’s revelation of the 
contradictions, restrictions and inadequacies of the western metaphysical philosophy 
that operates with dichotomous tools. The metaphor of Möbius strip that I have used 
in that chapter can be refined further here. Momentarily, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy can be regarded as the inversion section at the crucial twist of the Möbius 
strip. The twisted circle becomes a continuously flowing one '‘surface” The two 
surfaces become one (yet, perhaps imminently): In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophical accounts, there is no more bipolarity or dialectical relation of the 
distinct pairs with a hegemonic pole. The either clearly or supplementarily separated 
pairs of inside/outside, exteriority/interiority, subject/object, natural/cultural merge 
into ontological status of "the plane of consistency”.
There is even no more essential supplementarity (cf Derrida 
Deconstructing). It is, hence, even impossible to employ the one-and-two sided 
(twone!) metaphor of the Möbius strip, as it would not be that consistent. One 
should regard, instead. Von Koch’s curve —more than a line less than a surface—, and
Guattari (1987: 22 ff.) for the advises of the authors on reading their book as well as the 
information on how they wrote it. Although Grosz warns us somehow to avoid "a 
jargonized, sloganized” reading (1994: 225n5), yet the authors themselves seem to feel (and 
also aim to make us feel) more relaxed: . . write with slogans: Make rhizomes, not roots, 
never planti Don’t sow, grow offshootsl . . . Have short-term ideas. Make maps, not photos 
or drawings” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 24-5).
I believe Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical position is crucial as they emphasize the 
inversion of the strip that the western thought bears inherently and discretely. However, that is 
not all that. They show the strip’s transformation to the four and more (and less) 
dimensional realms, and its capacity in connecting with other complex "geometricals”. In 
addition to that, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze are not philosophically disparate in terms 
of their initial and major concerns and critiques. Therefore, I believe and hope that the three 
subsections will be somehow coherent and complimentary Spinoza’s philosophy, on the 
other hand is not only inspirational to Deleuze, but considered "as the precursor of 
Nietzsche”, as well (Gatens 1996: lOOff).
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Sierpensky’s sponge —more than surface, less than a volume— (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 474-500). Hierarchical organizations, ordered organisms, centrality of the 
subject, “relations between subject and object, substance, matter, corporeality” are all 
problematized by their challenging approach (Grosz 1994: 164). Moreover, their 
process of problematization, I believe, has the potential even to pave the way to a 
multi-territorial realm that is perhaps beyond the “dichotomy” between dichotomous 
and nondichotomous thought!
Deleuze and Guattari are connected “firmly” to the world (yet, they are at 
the fringes, at tlie extremes), to the land and sky, to the life, to other people and 
bodies, to day-to-day life, to the political. They are not for metaphysics but for 
physics; not Newtonian kind, but subatomic/astrophysics kind. They drive from 
quantum physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics: From the shortest life span of 
subatomic particles, and the indeterminable movement of electron; from molecular 
bonds and connections, and molar structures and reactions; from the smallest 
molecule that is alive, and the pervious membrane of the cell; from smooth and 
striated spaces, and fractals and chaos theory.
Deleuze and Guattari do not reject the immanency of the body or the 
interiority of the subjectivity neither categorically nor for the sake of emphasizing 
the ethical, social and implicitly political issues. Grosz points out that their notion of 
the human body, following Spinoza’s monistic model, is neither a “locus for a 
consciousness nor an organically determined entity”:
Their notion of the body as a discontinuous, nontotalizable series 
of processes, organs, flows, energies, corporeal substances and 
incorporeal events, speeds and durations, may be of great value . . . 
to reconceive bodies outside the binary oppositions imposed on the 
body by the mind/body, nature/culture, subject/object and 
interior/exterior oppositions. They provide an altogether different
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way of understanding the body in its connections with other bodies, 
both human and inhuman, animate and inanimate, linking organs 
and biological processes to material objects and social practices 
while refusing to subordinate the body to a unity or a homogeneity 
of the kind provided by the body’s subordination to consciousness 
or to biological organization (1994: 164-65).
The body, for them, can be understood definitely in terms of what it can do. 
The body performs', it establishes linkages with other bodies. Its capacities and 
boundaries are not stable or knowable in advance; what the body can do is 
unpredictable. Therefore, the conception of the body of Deleuze and Guattari does 
not focus on what the body lacks or what it seeks teleologically (cf. Freud’s Body and 
Lacan’s Body). They rather posit an affirmative understanding of the body that is not 
based on and bounded by the “lack”. Their body is a one that does, connects, 
becomes; the body that is alive in temporarily stable singularities in “its” world, yet which 
is the cause and effect of living in constantly unstable multiplicities among other bodies 
on “the” Earth.
Their notion of desire, accordingly, is different from that of psychoanalysis. 
Desire is not a longing or craving, but an actualization, “a series of practices, bringing 
things together or separating them, making machines, making reality” (Grosz 1994: 
165). Desire, for them, moves and does directionally, not intentionally: it looks for its 
self-expansion and proliferation; it does not seek to attain a particular object. 
Accordingly, desire is everywhere, in every direction, and it is at work in its machinic 
connections: “It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times 
in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983: 1). Desire produces, and is produced within, desiring machines, which are 
“inherently connective in nature: ‘and . . .’ ‘and then . . .’ ’’(Deleuze and Guattari 
1983: 5). Desiring-machines are always coupled with another —and within this linearly
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couplings of “production of production”-  they break the flow of the machine they 
connect, yet the current continues to flow:
Everywhere it is machines—real ones, not figurative ones: machines 
driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, 
with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine 
is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow 
that the other interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces 
milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it. The mouth of tlie 
anorexic wavers between several functions: its possessor is uncertain 
as to whedier it is an eating-machine, an anal-machine, a talking- 
machine, or a breathing-machine (asthma attacks). Hence we are all 
handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, 
an energy-machine: all tlie time, flows and interruptions. . . . 
Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere 
metaphors. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 1-2)
The above-mentioned understanding brings forth the questions related to the 
limits and boundaries of subject and object which, for Deleuze and Guattari, can not 
be clearly demarcated, can not be defined in terms of distinct boundaries. The 
questions have already been evoked: What else a mouth (or breast) does} Whose is it? 
What else can it coupled to? (Thu·, the limits of the “unified” subject are shattered). 
What does milk do that is produced by the breast-machine when it flows into the 
mouth-machine? Whose milk it is? (Thus the “distinct” object is fractured)^^.
This self is not alone . . . .  But it is no exaggeration to say that on 
this level the breast is as much a part of the baby’s body as it is of 
the mother’s. It is infolded in the infant brain. The human body as 
supermolecule has no determinate boundaries. (Massumi 1992: 73)
This is to say all things, material or psychical, animate or inanimate, can not 
be simply understood as “discrete entities or binary opposites”. However, this does
20 See Massumi 1992: 70ff.
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not mean that they should be regarded as united, holistic, or singular. They are more 
regarded as “series of flows, energies, movements, strata, segments, organs, 
intensities” (Grosz 1994: 167). What these nouns signify is a series of fragments, 
phases or modes of the bodies (of the subject and of the object) that are ever dynamic, 
ever voyaging, transforming and transformed . They are intersecting, and affecting 
and being affected; connected by the others they “touch” in the process of becoming. 
Identities (if there is any, as defined by its limits), therefore, can not be stable and 
static as long as bodies —whether animate or inanimate— encounter with other bodies. 
Deleuze and Guattari comments on this “essential” and “constitutive” relationship 
within the context of technological tools as follows:
Tools are inseparable from symbioses or amalgamations defining a 
Nature-Society machinic assemblage. . . . There is a primacy of tlie 
machinic assemblage of bodies over tools and goods, a primacy of 
the collective assemblage of enunciation over language and words. .
. . That is why a social field is defined less by its conflicts and 
contradictions than by the lines of flight running through it. An 
assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep 
structure nor superficial structure; it flattens all of its dimensions 
onto a single plane of consistency upon which reciprocal 
presuppositions and mutual insertions play themselves out.
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 90)
21 This specific -yet "‘constant'-  phase or mode of the bodies, I submit, is very much like the 
fourth state of the matter:plasma  ^ (e.g. the flame). It is neither a solid, nor a liquid, nor a gas; 
its permanence is not that of a substance, but that of a process. It requires a solid or a liquid 
that is flammable along with the oxygen in order to keep its phase. Its boundaries are not 
determinable, it is affected and it affects; it is not in a stable state. It transforms continuously 
both itself and what it burns. It produces gas and solid that are different from what they 
were initially, before it is connected to them. It is self-expansive: always looking for (not 
intentionally) other substances to be connected, to be transformed. Its boundaries (limits of 
identity) do not depend on itself, but the other bodies that it can reach, connect. It is not 
simply consuming but transforming in a constant exchange. It is constituted in the middle;
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Yet, the machinic assemblage of bodies has nothing to do with the
Descartes’s mechanistic view of the body, which is still dominant within the many
established knowledges and disciplines. Descartes envisaged the body via the
metaphor of machine in which the body is regarded as an object, an instrument, or a
22medium that is highly criticized for being separated from, and subordinated to mind 
(see Descartes Disembodied and Derrida Deconstructing). Wliereas in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception there is no central or hierarchical order or organization of 
being: human, animal, plant, inanimate things, all have the same ontological status . 
Moreover, disparate status of ideas and things, mind and matter is of no importance, 
after all, within the plane of consistency^"*. Ideas, things, bodies, all are series of 
fragments or elements capable of being linked together or detached apart in
the transformation process reconstitutes its “material”. Its “material” is different from the 
previous and following ones.
22 Cartesianism has caused the body to be investigated in distinct fields, rather than in its full 
complexity or "‘expansibility'’. It is regarded as an object for the natural sciences and 
humanities. For the former, the body is an organic system of interrelated parts of a merely 
physical and extended object that is functional. For the latter, it functions as an instrument 
for the disparately examined emotions, attitudes, experiences, or for cultural variations, or for 
the ontological status. The body, for psychoanalysis is a signifying medium, a vehicle of 
expression, and a conduit between die self and the society. It is rather like the nest of what is 
uncontrollable, unknown to the subject: the body as a means of expression of an otherwise 
incommunicable psyche.
23 Yet, this does not mean tliat the world is without strata. The hierarchies are simply not due 
to substances or their nature, but the result “of modes of organization of disparate 
substances. They are composed of lines, of movements, speeds, and intensities, rather than 
of things and their relations. Assemblages or multiplicities, then, because they are essentially 
in movement, in action, are always made, not found. They are the consequences of a practice” 
(emphasis added) (Grosz 1994: 167-68).
24 “The plane of consistency or of composition (planomenon) is opposed to the plane of 
organization and development. Organization and development concern form and substance. 
. . . But the plane of consistency knows nothing of substance and form: haecceities, which 
are inscribed on this plane, are precisely modes of individuation proceeding neither by form 
nor by the subject" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 506-7).
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potentially infinite ways. Machines and assemblages are provisional linkages and 
conjunctions (a plus b plus c . . .) or breaks and disjunctions of fragments of bodies, 
fragments of objects (i.e., flows, energies, movements, strata, segments, organs, 
intensities).
Machines and assemblages, hence, create provisional and temporary 
multiplicities. If they are the consequences of a practice, then they are inevitably 
limited and bounded by the space and time. They are not standard, not teleological, not 
following application principles; they are territorial, contextual, and hence finite in 
space and time. Assemblages, thereupon, are opposed to mechanism. They “always 
have an outside; they do not, or need not, belong to a higher-order machine . . . They 
are the condition as well as the effect of any making, any producing” (Grosz 1994: 
168).
Having mentioned desire and machinic assemblages, one must recur -o r 
proceed further— to the concept of “desiring machine” since it is where the Deleuze- 
and-Guattari’s body conception becomes more complex. Flows and intensities of a 
desiring machine compose the body and tliese flows and intensities themselves are 
composed of a series of desiring machines. There is no unity or oneness in a desiring 
machine. The elements and discontinuities that constitute it do not belong to a 
totality that is supposed to be completed -it is opposed to the psychoanalytical 
concept of “lack”. They do not re-present the real, for their function is not a 
signifying one: they produce and they themselves are real. The nomadic, 
unpredictable, creative desiring machine always experiments, by establishing linkages, 
connections, “making things”.
Deleuze and Guattari conceived of the relation of desiring machine and the
body that is responsive and nonresisting to its flows and intensities as to form the
78
“Body without Organs” (BwO), since the body, for them, is neither “a unified and 
unifying organism, an organism centered either biologically or psychically”, nor it is 
“cohesive through its intentionality or its capacity for reflection and self-reflection” 
(Grosz 1994: 168):
Whenever someone makes love, really makes love, that person 
constitutes a body without organs, alone and with the other person 
or people. A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of 
organs, but a body upon which that which serves as organs. . . .
Thus die body without organs is opposed less to organs as such 
than to the organization of the organs insofar as it composes an 
organism. The body without organs is not a dead body but a living 
body all the more alive and teeming once it has blown apart die 
organism and its organization. . . .  The full body without organs is a 
body populated by multiplicities. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 30)
The BwO is a “denaturalized” human body, which is in direct relation with 
the flows, intensities, and energies of other bodies, regardless of being animate or 
inanimate. The BwO is the body that is before the body is moulded into a regulated, 
stratified, ordered structure or organization: It is just like “the full egg before the 
extension of the organism, and the organization of the organs” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 153). The BwO, thus, is opposed to the organized organism, and not 
to the organs^^.
25 One must note that Deleuze and Guattari conceived the notion of BwO (from Antonin 
Artaud) initially in their Anti-Oedipus (published in the French in 1972) primarily in order to 
criticise Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalytic theories, along with to examine capitalism. Their 
use of the notion, thus, in this work is largely in negative terms. It is in their second volume 
of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia (i.e., A Thousand Plateaus, published in the French in 
1980) they have developed and used this notion in a much more extended context and in 
more affirmative terms: "‘We come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the 
opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism” (158). 
They have elaborated, then, the notion by describing two types of the BwO: the empty BwO,
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Thereupon, the BwO invokes a conception of the body that is opposed to 
that of psychoanalysis: the BwO is not -can not be- invested with “fantasies, images, 
projections, representations”. Yet, the BwO is not a body without a psychical 
interiority at all, but it is, primarily and simply, a surface that allows and produces 
different and various movements of intensities rather than being the locus for 
constant longings and cravings. It is the surface of speeds, intensities, and flows before 
they blend and unite into meaningful, organized “totalities constituting the unity of 
the subject and of signification” (Grosz 1994: 170). At this point, one must be 
cautious about the extended notion of the BwO for the fact that this term actually 
refers indiscernibly not only to human, animal bodies, but, to “textual, sociocultural, 
and physical bodies” also (Grosz 1994: 169)^ .^
The human body that is conceived of by Deleuze and Guattari is close to 
that of Spinoza’s monistic approach. For Spinoza, the body is not part of “passive 
nature ruled over by an active mind but rather the body is the ground of human 
action” (Gatens 1996: 57). Spinoza states that the mind is constituted by the 
embodiment: reason can be active only by the affirmation of a particular body, 
triggered by the actual existence of that body.
Therefore, the body is not merely a machine that is donmiated by the -absolute- 
mental activity for the simple fact that it is dependent the manner and the context in
and the full BwO toward which I do not proceed as I consider the part that I refer should be 
satisfactory, even if it is not “complete”.
26 That is exactly the reason that I have chosen to refer to the BwO just briefly, since the 
notion is scattered everywhere in the A Thousand Plateaus, and in various contexts -state, 
war, capitalism. I think, within the given limits of this study, it would suffice to mention the 
BwO within the extent that it is more directly related to the human body.
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which the body recreates itself. On that occasion, its identity can never be viewed as a 
final or finished product, its limits, boundaries, singularities are not stable and can not 
be known:
The Spinozist account of the body is of a productive and creative 
body which can not be definitely ‘known’ since it is not identical 
with itself across time. The body does not have a ‘truth’ or a ‘true’ 
nature since it is a process and its meaning and capacities will vary 
according to its context. We do not know the limits of this body or 
the powers that it is capable of attaining. These limits and capacities 
can only be revealed by the ongoing interactions of the body and its 
environment. (Gatens 1996: 57)
The embodied subject as it is conventionally assumed to be identical to itself, 
and being the center of its stable and unshakeable identity, thus, can not be^ .^
27 For a discussion of the validity and consequences of the question “who comes after the 
subject?” as well as the situatedness of the subject, see Doel 1995: 226-40.
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3 The Body from within Inside
The body is alive; that is also to say, it is a body that is “lived”. Its “interiority 
and inside” as well as its “exteriority and outside” is lived and experienced by the 
body. The inside constitutes and accepts itself as an outside; it experiences itself and 
structures gives meaning to the ways it is lived. The meaning and significance of the 
body and its parts are internalized in such a way that it constitutes the subject’s 
psychical interior: a process of introjection. On the other hand, in the aftermath the 
limits of the body are composed, experienced, and lived through projection. The 
projection constitutes the boundary and limit of subjectivity, which demarcates the 
subject from other subjects and from other objects. Thus the body is conceived as 
such is the body constituted from within inside.
The body is alive, yet, not only as a biological entity but also as a psychical entity. 
That is to say, for the premises of this model, the body does not “live” as an 
organism all by itself, but instead, the body is “lived” by the subject who (or perhaps, 
which) has acquired a cohesive bodp-image. The activity of the body, its functioning, 
and responsiveness emanate from the body-image, and the psychical interior of the 
subject. The body’s exteriority constituted as such, thus, is considered as the 
manifestation of the psychical interiority of the individual. Yet, as I have mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, the interiority of the subject is a function of the 
internalis(ation of the lived exteriority: a twist in the circular cycle, again. The standing 
point of the advocates of the lived body conception is at the opposite “side” of that
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of the figures discussed in the previous chapter (i.e.. The Body from within Outside). 
Yet, since the loop is that of a Möbius strip type, they can be contemplated eventually 
as being on the same “side”. Yet, they both may miss the inevitable trace that the 
“others” left behind.
Although I have discussed elsewhere, I feel the necessity of expounding my 
rather frequent use of the “opposite terms” such as the lived-body/the-body-as- 
surface, natural-body/socially-constructed body, interiority/exteriority, 
inside/outside, and psychical/physical. I do not intend, by any means, to invoke a 
bipolar or dualistic approach, which is characterized by having a hegemonic pole. 
Instead, as I have tried to discuss by the Möbius metaphor earlier, the “opposite 
terms” are used for the sake of practicality; as “means” rather than “ends”: They 
merely refer to the relative positioning, relative point of view —hence the shift in the 
emphasis- of the two major approaches, which are broadly categorized and brought 
together due to their “relative” proximity. It is always possible to detect the traces of 
the “opposite” approach in each other. I do not claim that the elements of the two 
models are conceived as opposed to each other, despite the fact that the models 
themselves may be developed as opposed to each other. This issue, however, have 
been and will be discussed throughout the text wherever it is appropriate to do so 
and thus it will not be discussed explicitly in the “conclusion” chapter.
Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, never reject the “interiority” of the 
subject, yet they criticise rigorously the “model of interiority” as Freud puts it forth. 
The same can be asserted for the different views within the “same” model. Lacan, for 
example, has accepted and even elaborated further the major concepts of Freud. 
However, he has developed another model, for instance, for the formation of he ego 
and effects of the unconscious. In short, some models and views may be regarded as
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antithetical; nevertheless the point is, they are not always compatible for comparison 
with their full extent and context as they have different perspectives in the first place 
and as none of them has a primary objective as theorizing the body in its full 
complexity, but rather, more importantly, they “use” the body and the conceptions 
they developed on it in their particular formulations.
My position here is just to map the major and varying conceptions neither by 
acting as a referee nor an advocate of a certain view. My intention is to explore the 
possibilities, by travelling through the territories of different models, which may lead 
us to an understanding that is more “adequate” in considering the complexity of the 
human body.
The body, as it is understood here, is not the surface of inscription but is 
“the site of the intermingling of mind and culture” (Grosz 1994: 116). The body as 
the surface of inscription, as I have discussed, is primarily marked, scarred, and 
written upon by laws, moral codes, social constraints and requirements: by exteriority, 
by forces of the others. Whereas, the lived body is considered as composed and 
invested by its oivn psychical, cerebral, and “spiritual” interiority. The interiority as 
such is impressed and coded by tlie pleasures, sensations, and experiences of the 
subject. Nevertheless, the lived body is also a social body, living among other bodies, 
and objects. The social and the external world, therefore, are incorporated into and 
absorbed by the subject through mediation and internalization rather than being 
directly inscribed upon. Yet, the notion of inscription is what persists in both of tlie 
models one from inside out, the other from outside in, in the beginning and as the 
driving force.
It is, in the final analysis, the “social” inscription that establishes psychical
interior and body-image or forces, powers, energies, and intensities. In either case, the
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starting point, i.e. the social encounters with others, and the final destination, i.e. the 
body that is constituted and shaped, are same; however, since the paths are detoured 
separately, the perspectives differ accordingly. All of the followings, I submit, can be 
considered as the outcome and product of “social encounters with others”: 
Nietzschean restrictions of the moral values and social norms, Foucauldian power 
and control mechanisms, and Deleuzian machinic connections are all encounters witli 
the others as other than the self, which have effects on the evolution and the conception 
of the body. On the other hand, Freudian libidinal investment, Lacanian mirror stage 
and imaginary anatomy, Merleau-Ponty’s double sensation, relations, and perception 
are all formed through social encounters with the others, in which the self functions as 
the other in the first place.
The lived body model is much more concerned with the questions of the 
body in terms of what it feels like rather than what it does. Yet, that does not mean that 
the two are separated, obviously the two has intertwined inseparably, and operate in 
fast oscillations (the twone surface of the Möbius). It takes the detour that passes 
through the body-subject’s labyrinth-like interior (psychical terms) searching the 
depths for what is hidden, discrete, and lacking. While on the contrary, the other 
model follows the body-subject’s winding exterior path (corporeal terms) examining 
the surface for the cavities or convexities formed by its connections and contacts. 
Grosz starts from the well-known instance of nursing infant to illustrate the 
difference:
The child’s lips, for example, form connections (or in Deleuzian 
terms, machines, assemblages) with the breast or bottle, possibly 
accompanied by hand in conjunction with an ear, each system in 
perpetual motion and in mutual interrelation. Instead of seeing the 
obsessional person’s desire for impenetrability as a yearning for 
what is absent and lost (a staving off of the castration threat and
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the expression of the desire to occupy the position of the symbolic 
fatlier), the obsessional person’s toes can be seen to make machinic 
connections with sand, witli rocks, with grass, such that these 
“external objects” can no longer be considered either an 
internalized part of the subject or an expelled external residue of 
the subject. (Grosz 1994: 116)
Psychoanalysis and phenomenology are the two major fields of knowledges 
that are concerned with the conception of the body as such. Psychoanalytic theory 
and its methods differ from those of biology and psychology, although it derived a 
lot from them. Whereas phenomenology approaches to the problems of perception 
and reflection from the inside while it seeks to avoid the antinomies that throw 
idealism and realism (or accordingly any other of the dichotomous pairs) into 
opposition. Below, I will discuss and depict briefly the conceptions of the body that 
vary within the specific theories developed by Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Although effected and shaped by the social encounters, still the lived body is 
considered as somehow pre-social, and furnished with a strong biological base that 
has the priority. The self and the relations with the society are supposed to be 
founded on this base. The complexities of social relationships and those of any other 
“exterior” force must be internalized by the individual, by the subject in the first 
place. Then through the complexity of inner mechanism and self-reflexivity it 
constitutes not only the self, but its relation with the others, as well -the process of 
the body-as-surface- inscription model is turned in a way upside down. The body in 
this process has a crucial role. It is the medium of communication to the subject that 
it can transfer information and meaning both from and to itself and from and to the 
others. Yet, also the body is the screen of the inner world on which the subject can
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trace what has happened to itself as a consequence of its connections with the outer 
world.
3.1 Freud’s Body
The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merejy a 
surface entity, but is itself the projection o f a surface .
Sigmund Freud has achieved a coherent theory of psychoanalysis after long 
and arduous studies on various neurological and psychical mechanisms in which he 
primarily questioned the relations between perception, thought, and consciousness. 
He did not start with an intention to define the formation of the ego or the psychical 
topographies (unconscious-preconscious-conscious). Rather he started from a series of 
works in which he initially aimed to establish a sound relation between biology, 
neurology, and psychology. It is said that this initial drive seems to explain why he 
returns in his psychological writings frequently to the points where biology and 
psychology, for him, meets, and why he relied on the models and metaphors derived 
from biology (Elliott 1992, Krueger 1989). In accordance to that, his notions of 
energy, libido, drive, and force are borrowed from biological models.
In due course of his initial studies on perception, he has concerned with 
theorizing the interface between soma and psyche. Therefore, in his theory, although
 ^Sigmund Freud in The Ego and the Id.
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being mostly implicit, there is always an emphasis on the body and the body parts 
(along with their mental or psychic representations), which have remained rather 
undeveloped in further theoretical studies by his successors. Similarly, the further 
developments concerning the clinical practice have shared the same fate, despite 
psychoanalysis was intended as a mode of practice within the psychotherapeutic 
method, which includes the therapy of bodily disorders . David Krueger claims that 
the body and its evolving mental representation have been largely omitted from 
developmental and psychoanalytic theory, and consequently tlie “body se lf’ has been 
subordinated to the “psychological se lf’ particularly within the clinical practice of 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis (1989: ix).
Freud, in the course of developing his theory of psychoanalysis, has 
recognized the body as the foundation for the ego formation. The ego, in Freudian 
theory, “is given representation since it identifies, through an interplay of projection 
and introjection, with the surfaces of the body” (Elliott 1992: 33). The embodiment, 
for Freud, is tlie a priori element that constitutes the ego, which establishes 
subjectivity through a complex mechanism that involves dynamic effects of the
 ^ Such as, anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, sadism, masochism, narcissism, transvestism, 
voyeurism, exhibitionism, hypochondria, and also, homosexuality, hysteria, obsessive- 
compulsive disorder, manic depression, paranoia, and schizophrenia. Wliether these are 
considered as merely manifestation of a psychological, mental, or a psychiatric illness is 
remained a question; the intertwined source and location of the pathology are always 
dynamic and complex: Is it the body or the mind? Is it the brain or the conflict between the 
body and the body-image?
The following sources seem to be useful in this respect: Schilder 1964, Lingis 1989, 
Krueger 1989, Elliott 1992, Grosz 1994,1995, and Anzieu 1989.
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unconscious. Moreover, the first reality that the infant"* “perceives” is the reality of 
the body and, hence, the “bodily experiences and sensations, internal and surface, 
form die core around which the ego develops” (Krueger 1989: 4).
The given priority of the embodiment, yet, in Freudian theory does not 
mean the biological, organic structure of the body suffices for the formation of the 
ego. Freud is not for biological reductionism since his theories of perception and 
subjectivity have shown that there can not be a biological or neurological foundation 
or master plan that determines psychological processes. Freud asserts that biology 
must be understood as psychologically pliable up to an extent. On the contrary to the 
reductionist view, “a two-way determination, or overdetermination, a clear interaction 
of the biological and the psychological, is forged in his writings” (Grosz 1994: 28). 
Furthermore, by demonstrating the role of anatomically indeterminable and unstable 
unconscious in the formation of subjectivity, he has demolished the Cartesian 
understanding of the ego as fixed, indivisible, permanent whole. The Cartesian 
cogito, the rational and knowledgable subject, whose first truth is, “I think, therefore 
I am”, has been devastated by the introduction of the unconscious (Elliott 1992, Grosz 
1994, 1995):
Freud argues that consciousness is discontinuous, being
overdetermined and dislocated by unconscious processes. On tliis
Although various terms such as the infant, baby, child are used in different sources for the 
human being who is at the early stages of its life, I prefer to use particularly, following Lacan, 
the term “infant”. For the reason that not only it refers to, etymologically a baby before it 
can walk, and one unable to talk, but, to a beginner, as in experience or learning, and 
anything in the first stage of existence or progress, also. (Random House Webster’s 
Electronic Dictionary and Thesaurus’s definition: 1350-1400; ME enfaunt < AF < L 
infantem, acc. infans small child, lit., one unable to speak = in- IN -3 -l- fans, prp. of fari to 
speak).
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view, the essence of being lies not in cogito, but in the vicissitudes 
of desire. . . there is no stable ground at the level of unconscious.
Broadly conceived, the unconscious is an incessant irruption of 
representational forms, drives and affects, which as meaning and 
force continually displace one another. And it is precisely from this 
concern with the representational activity of the unconscious that 
Freud will theorize the subject’s development of a relation to the 
self, the body, others, and culture itself (Elliott 1992: 29)
I prefer here not to dive into the depths of Freudian understanding of 
psychical topographies and their relation with the pleasure principle, sexual drive and 
desire. However, I suggest proceeding with his theory of the ego as corporeal 
projection and its relation with perception
The ego, for Freud, is a consequence of a perceptual surface; its formation, 
evolution, production is relative to this surface. Before the ego, the infant has no 
control either over its organic structure or over its relations with other objects and 
subjects. Although it may respond to them, it simply can not behave as an agency. It 
is with the narcissist formation of the ego the monadic world of the infant is split 
and fractured, and the vast and o' '^^erwhelming diversity of perceptions are brought 
into a unity (Elliott 1992: 18-33).
 ^ It may be useful, at this point, to give the definitions of some of the important concepts. 
Unconscious'. The part of the psyche that is rarely accessible to awareness but that has a 
pronounced influence on behaviour. Id'. The part of the psyche that is the source of 
unconscious and instinctive impulses that seek satisfaction in accordance with the pleasure 
principle. Libido: All of the instinctual energies and desires that are derived from the id. Ego: 
The conscious, rational component of the psyche that experiences and reacts to the outside 
world and mediates between the demands of the id and superego. Superego: The part of the 
personality representing the conscience, formed in early life by internalization of the 
standards of parents and other models of behaviour. Cathexis: The investment of emotional 
significance in an activity, object, or idea.
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Since the mother (and her breast) is repeatedly disconnected from it, the 
infant seeks to recapture its libidinal plenitude: a process, which ends in its own body. 
The libidinal drives round back upon the ego, making it an object of investment in 
just the same manner as “external” objects. Elliott quotes from Freud regarding the 
narcissistic stage:
There comes a time [!]^  in the development of the individual at 
which he unifies his sexual drives (which have hitherto been 
engaged in auto-erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; 
and he begins to take his own body as his love-object, and only 
subsequently proceeds from tliis to the choice of some person 
other than himself. (1992: 31)
The psychical action, which Freud has called “primary narcissism” (similar to, 
yet different from the Lacanian mirror stage ), thus is a process of stabilization of 
the circulation of libido in the infant’s body that is rigorously at work at this stage. 
This split in relation to the self and the other is crucial to psychical organization and 
the development of the self and self-identity. By experiencing primary narcissism, the 
division between subject and object —and even the subject’s capacity to take itself as
 ^The evolution of Freud’s theory has a trajectory that can be characterized by exhibiting 
constant revisions of his previous writings. Taken into account the vast amount of them, 
however, it seems to me one must be extremely cautious when utilizing his specific ideas, 
since there is always a risk to use a superseded (by himself) conception of his. Also the 
partiality of his thoughts within his ""progressive” track may cause one to get lost in different 
contexts while searching the finalized revision of a particular notion of Freud’s. As for the 
concept of primary narcissism, for instance, I have failed to find a satisfactory explanation 
concerning its initiation and termination. I am not sure, though, whether this is due to the 
secondary literature I have used, or due to the vagueness or incompleteness of Freud’s 
theorization. However, I want to draw the attention of the reader to the vague phrase Freud 
has used in the quotation above: ""there comes a time . . .”1 Lacan seems to notice this point 
as he developed a theory (mirror stage) that refines the circumstances of this moment more 
clearly. See the section: Lacan’s Body.
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an object— becomes possible for the first time. Since the body is libidinally invested 
“the subject can not remain neutral or indifferent to its own body and body parts” 
(Grosz 1994: 32).
The subject, commencing from this stage of its life, always maintains a 
relation of love and/or hate toward its own body and bodily parts. Thus, the role of 
the body, here, is that of a surface with libidinal intensities of which the ego 
constructs a psychical map. The ego, thereupon, is shaped not by the anatomical 
body, but by the degree of libidinal cathexis of the body. The interior and exterior of 
the body as such is perceived as having zones of varying intensities of libido —which 
may shift in time, and thus does not necessarily overlap with the “natural” erotogenic 
zones. The perception through the skin, the exterior surface of the body, however, 
has a priority over the interiority due to its “natural advantage”:
The information provided by tlie surface of the skin is botli 
endogenous and exogenous, active and passive, receptive and 
expressive, the only sense able to provide the “double sensation.”
Double sensations are diose in which the subject utilizes one part of 
the body to touch another, thus exhibiting the interchangeability of 
active and passive sensations, of those positions of subject and 
object, mind and body. (Grosz 1994: 35-6)
The surface of the body is both where the internalization process begins and 
where the projection mechanism ends primarily at this stage of the subject’s life. It is 
where the subject “meets” with the rest of the world (Krueger 1989: 9). This 
confrontation with “reality” initiates a gradual process of differentiation in which the 
ego emerges from out of the id. This is made possible only through the impact of
7 For a short comparison between Freud’s primary narcissism and Lacan’s mirror stage, see
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perceptual stimuli on the surface of the organism. Grosz writes that Freud explained 
that “the ego is something like a ‘psychical callous’ formed through the use of the 
body, and particularly its surface” (1994; 37).
The ego, then also, is like a “screen” on which the images of the body’s outer 
surface is projected, and also a mapping of the body’s inner surface, the surface of 
sensations, intensities, and affects —which are the subjective experience of bodily 
sensations and experiences. The ego is derived, as a representation, as an outline, 
from these surfaces since they provide the content of what the body perceives. The 
body, hence, functions as a perceptual surface for the ego in the process of the ego 
formation. Perception as such is a term “that requires a transgression of the binarism 
of the mind/body split” (Grosz 1994: 28). Being the psychical registration of the 
impacts of external and internal stimuli, it “exists” in between the mind and the body. 
It shows the irreducible dependence of the inside and outside, mind and matter, on 
each other.
Although they have different concerns in examining and using the Freudian 
theory, Krueger, Elliott, and Grosz state the question, “How is consciousness of our 
own thoughts possible?” that Freud has asked, was one of the problematic nodes that 
guided him to theorize the formation of the ego. Freud has concluded that if internal 
processes such as thinking are to become conscious, they must first function like 
external perceptions. For him, the organism receives two kinds of messages when it is 
stimulated by the perception of the facts. One from receptive senses of the nervous 
system, and one from consciousness, which confirms the veracity of the first, and
next subsection.
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only by then, we can have thoughts that have any “reality”. In another words, only 
then our “thoughts can have stability, longevity, or identity” (Grosz 1994: 30). This, 
actually, shows that the language functions (concepts) as an external stimulus for us 
to perceive our own thoughts:
The part played by word-presentations now becomes perfectly 
clear. By their interposition, internal thought processes are made 
into perceptions. It is like a demonstration of the theorem that all 
knowledge has its origin in external perception. When a 
hypercathexis of the process of thinking takes place, thoughts are 
actually perceived —as if they came from without— and are 
consequently held to be true. (Quoted in Grosz 1994: 30, from 
Freud’s The Ego and tlie Id')
Krueger’s succinct explanation of the stages of the formation of the ego 
epitomizes the role of the body; he starts from Lacanian “Real”, and proceeding 
through primary narcissism, self-awareness, and the longevity of the subjectivity 
towards acquisition of identity:
First, the body self is function of anotlier. Next, it is immediate, 
felt experience, the emerging extension experience of unsatisfied 
need. Next the body self is form, objectively distinct patterns of 
behaviour, as well as the subjective and systematic experience of 
reality. Finally, it is concept, a relatively enduring frame of reference, 
comprised bodily and emotional images, concepts, and experiences.
The quality of relative stability over time constitutes die aspect of 
identity. The metaphors that characterize everything from style to 
defense, as well as metaconcepts such as “self,” are aspects of the 
self concept. As a concept, the self is a fiction, but not a myth.
(1989: 13-14)
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3.2 Lacan’s Body
The mirror stage is a drama. . .  the succession o f  phantasies 
that extends from  afragmented bo^-image to a form  o f  its 
totality. . . which will mark ivith its rigid structure the subject’s
entire mental development.
Jacques Lacan, following Freud, has claimed that the ego has to be 
constituted. Since it is not present at birth, it is to be formed, shaped through the 
early stages of human life. For Lacan, the ego comes into being in the mirror stage. It 
is within this stage that a radical and painful change of order occurs in the life of the 
infant. This shift or rather sudden leap of order triggers a crucial split that the 
division between the infant’s body from the other’s bodies and surrounding objects is 
realized by itself —for the first time. By intensely focusing on the formation of the 
“I”, Lacan brings forth concepts of the imaginary, symbolic and real orders that 
define the peculiarities of the stages within the formation process. What Freud seems 
to leave in a blurred state when theorizing the primary narcissism, thus, appears to be 
more adequately delineated in Lacan’s mirror stage .^
I am led . . . .  to regard the function of the mirror—stage as a 
particular case of the function of the imago, which is to establish a
Jacques Lacan in Écrits: A Selection.
What Lacan strives to explain, I believe, is the mechanism that occurs at exactly the 
moment for which Freud has vaguely used the phrase “there comes a time.” Although Freud 
implies the moment in which the libidinal drives round back upon the ego for the first time, 
Lacan follows a different path.
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relation between the organism and its reality —or, as they say, 
between the Innenmlt m d  die . (Lacan 1977: 4)
Since Imago is an idealized concept of a loved one, therefore for Lacan, the 
infant is fascinated by an image, not that of any body’s, but primarily that of its own 
bo^'s. Lacan, accordingly, describes “the formative effect” of the mirror stage on 
“infant’s” ego as an “introjection of an (externalized) image of its own body” (Grosz 
1994: 39). Taking Freud’s comments about the ego being a bodily extension or 
projection very seriously, Lacan elaborated Freud’s views. He envisaged the ego as 
not a projection of the real anatomical and physiological body but as an imaginary 
projection of the body, the body insofar as it is imagined and represented for the 
subject by the image of others. The term “image of the others” implies, in Lacan, the 
image of the infant itself, since it first encounters with its image as an image of an 
other. In order to understand the mirror stage as an identification process, however, one 
must stress the centrality of the Lacanian concepts of the real, imaginary, and 
symbolic orders (Lacan 1977, 1979).
The real order, for Lacan, can only become available to interpretation 
through its effects (Lacan 1979: Chapter 5)” . The first six months of human life, the 
pre-mirror period, is the realm of the Real. The Real is the plenitude, the continuous
Imago·, an idealized concept of a loved one, formed in childhood and retained unaltered in 
adult life (L. imago IMAGE: the adult being perceived as the true exemplar of the species, as 
opposed to the larva “ghost” and pupa “doll.”). Innemvelt and Vmwelt, more or less, 
correspond to the inner life, interiority and outer world, exteriority respectively.
For this section, in addition to Lacan’s book The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis. I have consulted the notes of the graduate course “GRA 541: Graphic and 
Visual Representation”, given by Assoc. Prof Mahmut Mutman, in the fall semester of 1996 
at Bilkent University School of Fine Arts, Design and Architecture.
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flux of intensities and energy. It is when and where the body is in bits and pieces. 
The infant does not have a corporeal boundary sense in the Real. It is not possible to 
sense the Real, or describe it when one is in it; it is a state tliat one can not be self­
reflexive, thus there is no “one” in it, but everything. It is a realm of impossibility; 
there is no way to experience this stage of human life either when one lives in it or 
when one strives to compensate the lack of it by trying to recuperate the plenitude 
she has lost at the later stages of her life. There is not only no distinction or hierarchy 
in the Real, but no differentiation also. It can only be described retroactively; after its 
order is broken.
The body in this period is “experienced as a series of fragmented needs, 
organs, and part-objects” (Elliott 1992: 129). Lacan has introduced the notion of the 
objetpetit a (small lacking objects) at this point. He has developed the notion to refer 
to objects that can not be mirrored or symbolized (such as gaze, lips, voice, and so 
on, but not as breast, penis, faeces, and so on). These objects or bodily parts 
continuously play a constituting role in the formation of the ego. These body parts 
cause the introjection of certain primordial images and signs, which always escape the 
knowledge of the subject. As Elliott states “Structured by the inescapable lack and 
destitution of the real order,” the crucial point for Lacan, “is that such zones of tlie 
body always escape the imaginary and symbolic capacities of the subject” (1992: 129). 
Lacan writes:
These objects have one common feature in my elaboration of them 
—they have no specular images, or in other words alterity . . .  It is 
what enables them to be the ‘stuffing’ or rather die lining, though 
not in any sense the reverse, of the very subject that one takes to be 
the subject of consciousness. (Lacan 1977: 315)
In short, the objet petit a provides a particular subjective perspective on the
foundations of psychical reality. That is meant to say, the objet petit a is the first step
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that creates the differentiation of people as they construct particular unities, 
meanings, and identities. By the introduction of the imaginary and symbolic orders, 
the subject has to follow its own way that exhibits uniqueness, although the stages 
remain the same for everyone. The objet petit a represents the object of desire, it 
“represents that lost part of tlie self which the ‘subject of the unconscious’ forever 
tries to recapture through phantasies of wholeness” (Elliott 1992: 143). It is, for 
Lacan, in effect, the essential lack that structures the desire of the human subject.
The imaginary order is what comes after the Real, yet it is a realm of being in 
which the division between the subject and object still does not exist clearly. “The 
imaginary order,” for Lacan, is “rather a world of distorted illusions. It comprises 
images and delusions that are constituted through a reflecting surface, a mirror” 
(Elliott 1992: 124). Moreover its from this imaginary merging of self and other, 
subject and object, it is possible to reformulate the genesis of the ego. What enables 
the formation of the ego as such is a primordial alienation that constitutes an eternal 
“lack” which will structure all self and other relations'^. The reflected image of the 
infant is profoundly “imaginary” for Lacan since the pleasing image of the body that 
is in “unity” is actually in direct contrast to the fragmentary state of the infant’s real 
body. The “jubilant cry” that the infant utters and the narcissism that the infant 
derives from its image can not be, thus, regarded as a positive sign. On the contrary.
12 For Lacan, the concept of the human subject is very complex, as it comprises the three 
orders of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. Although the narcissistic phantasies are 
originally evolved from the pre-Oedipal imaginary stage, they continue “to exert profound 
influence over all subsequent self and other relations” (Elliott 1992: 124ff). Also cf. Krueger 
1989, and Grosz 1994.
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the capture of the ”1” by the reflection is inseparable from a misrecognition of the 
gap between the fragmented subject and its unified image of itself:
For the split between the subject’s real body and its specular image 
means that the ego is painfully cut off from others; others who 
might possibly have acted as an emotional basis for the 
development of mutuality and intersubjectivity. The mirror stage 
thus requires the subject to relinquish any such hope of mutual 
dependency and experience. . . . The Lacanian self is thus located 
from the beginning within a damaging maginary space, inserted into 
a radical split, between an illusory sense of selfhood and something 
profoundly other. (Elliott 1992: 128)
Lacan’s imaginary exists, contrary to Freud’s conception, before the 
unconscious is brought into existence by the symbolic order. The infant experiences 
the symbolic order after it. enters the realm of the language. Words come to “stand in” 
for the loss of imaginary desires and loves, as the baby (not “infant” anymore) seeks 
to overcome lack through symbolic expression. The introduction of the language is 
the raison d ’être of the unconscious. Yet, for Lacan the symbolixation can never nullify 
that fundamental and irreducible lack which is the subject. Yet, the subject constituted 
as such experiences lack and lives alienating effects of the three orders 
interchangeably all through its life course:
Through an inmixing of body, desire, and signifiers the objet a 
inscribes a particular subjective style and causes certain imaginary 
phantasies that “cover over” or “suture” that gap which is taken by 
Lacan to be at the center of human subjectivity. Accordingly, it is 
because the human subject first experiences its body as 
fragmentation, lack, and loss that is forever prevented from 
establishing itself as “complete” or “whole”. For Lacan, this is the
13
13 Lacan uses the term méconnaissance in the Ecrits: A Selection, yet Elliott and Grosz use 
misrecognition.
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fundamental trajectory that desire will follow in all human social 
relationships. (Elliott 1992: 130)
The crux of Lacan’s theory of the formation of the ego lies in the fragile 
and fractured process known as the mirror stage that is tightly dependent on the 
corporeal terms. For Lacan, the ego is imaginary, a “drama”, in the sense of the 
misrecognition which the reflected image of its body generates. In contra to Freud’s 
theory of the body as the site of the libidinal investments in the primary narcissism, 
Lacan’s ego has no self-reflective capacities as such. The narcissistic illusions of the 
subject, for Lacan, can only lead to an infinite retrogression. Although in both 
theories, the identification process is the psychical basis for the formation of the ego, 
the moments that it commences differ. In Freud’s account, it arises from the primary 
unconscious with the repression of the Oedipus complex. Whereas in Lacan, the 
primary identification with the self is before the unconscious (before the language), it 
starts through the reflections of the body in the mirror stage.
3.3 Merleau-Ponty’s Body
I am always on the same side o f  my body14
Merleau-Ponty’s body is a phenomenon, or a series of phenomena, which is 
lived by an embodied consciousness. Although the body, for Merleau-Ponty, is both
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible.
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object (for others) and a lived reality (for the subject), it is neither simply an object 
nor simply a subject. The related, interconnected, and simultaneous experiences of 
having an embodied consciousness and of being embodied can eventually be 
expressed only as “I both have and am a body” (Turner 1996: 80). Neither nature nor 
consciousness is given priority in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account. He 
believes mind is embodied, is incarnated into the “flesh”.
The body has to be lived (Merleau-Ponty 1992: viii). It is only through the 
lived body, that one establishes a relation with the other things; it is qua embodied that 
complex relations are made possible. A subject, thus, can achieve consciousness and 
knowledge (reflection) and can develop perception and behaviour only by living the 
body (Pile 1996: 50-3). Therefore, it also requires a folding on itself; one can access 
to knowledge of its own body only by living it. Objects (including other subjects) in 
the environment, in this sense, provide a medium on which the subject can reflect 
upon itself. The body, thus, and its position among the objects becomes the 
instrument for the generation of meaning and knowledge (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 90-
4).
Merleau-Ponty’s body is not a passive one that just “answers” the world, but 
an active body that is capable of “authoring” the world. The body as such is not just 
a medium of receptacle, a mere receiver of external stimuli, but an active body that 
makes connections, establishes relations with objects in a continuous, ever-changing 
process of mutual definition.
The body is the condition and context through which one is able to have
relation to other objects and other subjects. Phenomenological reflection on the body
discloses that the subject is not disparate or separated from neither space, matter, and
time, nor from other subjects. Human behaviour, for Merleau-Ponty, through
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embodied action, is intelligent, purposive, and skilful. Yet, “its purpose and 
intelligent, etc. are not derived from a specific (mental) act of intellection, etc. which 
is prior to or separate from it” (Crossley 1996: 100).
For Merleau-Ponty, perception precedes conception: the perceived world is 
the always presupposed foundation of all knowledge as well as all action since the 
body is the lived field of perception. Perception is the birth place, the nest of the 
thought, the word. The conception of perception that Merleau-Ponty developed is 
notably, yet surprisingly similar to Derrida’s supplementary readings of dichotomies. 
Perception, for Merleau-Ponty, is in the space in-between inside and outside, mind and 
body, it is an oscillation, a perpetual motion. It is not containable in either side as it is 
“midway between mind and body and requires the functioning of both” (Grosz 1994: 
94). Perception, in effect, is not linked to the “privileged” locus of consciousness. 
Perception, moreover for Merleau-Ponty, requires an understanding of the senses as 
functioning in mutual synergy (O’Neill 1989: 37-9). Senses are translatable into each 
other, and yet can not be separated from each other. They are communicable to each 
other: they can even enrich each other by providing confirmations, or sometimes 
struggle to overcome the contradictions caused by themselves. Merleau-Ponty 
conceives the senses as the sign of the “intellect and intentionality” of the body and 
connects it with the synthesis of senses among themselves:
It is not the epistemological subject who brings about the synthesis, 
but the body, when it escapes from dispersion, pulls itself together 
and tends by all means of its power towards one single goal of its 
activity, and when one single intention is formed in it through the 
phenomenon of synergy. We withdraw this synthesis from the 
objective body only to transfer it to the phenomenal body, the body, 
that is, in so far as it projects a certain ‘setting’ round itself, in so far 
as its ‘parts’ are dynamically acquainted with each other, and its 
receptors are so arranged as to make possible, through their synergy, 
the perception of the object. What is meant by saying that tliis
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intentionality is not thought is that it does not come into being 
through the transparency of any consciousness, but takes for 
granted all the latent knowledge of itself tliat my body possesses. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 232-3)
Thus in short, for Merleau-Ponty in this sense, the “body is the fabric into 
which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to die perceived world, the 
general instrument of my ‘comprehension’ ” (1962: 235).
The term jlesh  that Merleau-Ponty has conceived is well worth to mention 
here. The flesh, in accordance with his understanding of perception as being 
inbetween, is the principle of difference; it designates the noncoincidence and 
divergence of the being, it is being’s most elementary level (O’Neill 1989: 18-22, 
Grosz 1994: 100-3). The flesh is being’s reversibility and reflexivity. Merleau-Ponty 
elucidates it with the example of “double sensation”. Objectivity and subjectivity, in 
his terms, can be sensed partially and reversibly: when a hand of a person touches its 
own body, when a person sees itself, hears itself, smells and tastes itself. Feeling 
(sensing) as a subject, and being felt (being sensed) as an object are the continuous 
ambiguity we already always experience. We have/are both, thus, phenomenal and 
objectual body. Grosz exemplifies it through “touch” and compare it to the 
supposedly dominant “seeing”:
The example of touch is in fact far more convincing, for the gulf 
between subject and object is never so distant as in vision, where 
the crossing of the subject into the object is more easily 
recognizable because access to eitlier the inside or the outside is 
simply a matter of shifting focus radier than literally changing 
positions. Merleau-Ponty wishes to apply the same principles of 
folding back or invagination that mark his discussion of the double 
sensation. While it is clear that in the case of touch, the toucher is 
always touched, in traditional understandings of vision, the seer sees 
at a distance and is implicated in what is seen. But for Merleau- 
Ponty the seer’s visibility conditions vision itself, is the ground seer
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shares with the visible, the condition of any relation between diem.
(Grosz 1994: 101)
Therefore, it is our ambiguous feeling of “being always on the same side of 
our body” that makes actually possible for us to experience and realize the 
connections and relations we establish with other bodies —objects and/or subjects- 
and with ourselves as well as our source of acquiring “authorization” on the world 
through the mutual interrelatedness of the “intellect” of our body and mind. It is 
through the lived body we perceive, and somehow reflect unto ourselves, the 
ambiguity and tension of being (feeling as) an object (both for others and for 
ourselves) and a subject (always for ourselves) simultaneously. It is the “flesh” as 
difference, or as trace, that makes this doubling back on itself possible. The 
perceiving subject has the capacity “to turn the world back on itself’. Perception, 
thus, involves both to understand the outside and the inside, yet, not in a relation of 
simple dualism, but through the “difference”, the “flesh”. Thereupon, the body/the 
subject is no more a closed nucleus of identity, nor an empty receptacle, and, the 
world/the object is no more a pure materiality nor an accumulation of sensations. No 
more clearly distinct categories, but the “flesh”, that is the difference.
Merleau-Ponty’s premise is a non-Cartesian type from the beginning. He 
envisages a necessary interrelatedness between and being-togetherness of the mind 
and the body. In his phenomenological approach -which he sees as a ceaseless 
interrogation—, he accepts the ambivalence, ambiguity and complexity of perception, 
of being embodied, and of interiority and exteriority: that is, in short, of being-in- 
the-world. The body, thereupon, is a thing that is related to not only its parts and the 
mind, but to other things in the world: it is a style of being. According to Merleau- 
Ponty:
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pThe body as] flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To 
designate it, we should need the old term ‘element’, in the sense it 
was used to speak water, air, earth, and fire, that is in the sense of a 
general things midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the 
idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being 
wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in tliis sense an 
‘element’ of Being. Not a fact of or a sum of facts, and yet 
adherent to location and the now. (1968: 139-40)
We are therefore bounded by space and time, and thus as we are in a 
continuous movement and in mutual relation in the process of defining and giving 
meaning, we are unavoidably connected to the others within the environment, within 
the socm ^ . Thereupon, we primarily exist as body, as flesh, and not as a mere res 
cogitans, a thinking substance as Descartes had envisaged.
Cartesian subject exists only as mind since cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I 
exist) is the motto, which gives birth to the mind/body distinction that disembodies 
the subject, and which eventually caused it to be regarded as existing in an 
independent, isolated situation from other bodies, and even from other minds 
(O’Neill 1989: 101-2). In Cartesian dualism, the clear and distinct oppositions of 
mind and the body has implied an asocial subject: “as a thinking substance, the mind 
is independent from tlie body {res extensà)·, it needs nothing more than itself to exist 
(Jung 1996 3-4). Cartesian model has promoted an “objective” modality of having a
Social is characterized by friendly companionship, a relationship, living or disposed to live 
in companionship with others or in a community, ratlier than in isolation: L. socialis = soci 
(us) partner, comrade.
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body, whereas in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology the body of mine is a “subjective” 
modality of being, yet such a being does not and can not live alone, it is a social body.
Turner is missing the point of being embodied “in the world” when he 
thinks that phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty is asocial. Turner critiques the 
phenomenological account as being too individualistic as the embodiment is, he 
claims, “taken from the point of view of the subject; it is consequently an account 
largely devoid of historical and sociological content” (1996; 78). Turner adds that 
from a sociological point of view, “the body” is socially constructed and socially 
experienced. However, I believe Merleau-Ponty has no objection to that. On the 
contrary to Turner’s critical review of phenomenological body, for Merleau-Ponty the 
body is the “umbilical cord” to the social Qung 1996: 5). To be social is first and 
foremost to be intercorporeal yet the body is not claimed to be the fixed origin of that:
Only because of the body are we said to be visible and capable of 
relating ourselves first to other bodies and then to other minds. The 
body is our socialplacement in the world. With the synergetic interplay 
of its senses, the body attunes us to tlie world. The world, as 
Merleau-Ponty has it, is made of the same stuff as the body 
presumably because we relate ourselves to the world by the medium 
of the body which is the lived field of perception. Since we are 
always already social, the body cannot be the ‘origin’ but, more 
properly, of die ambient medium of the social. (Jung 1996: 5)
Moreover, as Nick Crossley puts it, Merleau-Ponty “identifies the historical 
and social bases” of the embodied actions (1996: 100-1). Merleau-Ponty argues that 
embodied actions are based in “habit”, that is acquired skills, schemas and techniques 
drawn from  a social stock. Merleau-Ponty’s body is also historical as he implicitly 
states it: “feelings and passional conduct are invented like words”, thus, it is situated 
and obviously it is not isolated from the historical (1962; 189). Yet, his work 
functions in different temporal frame than the understanding of a classical
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historicism. Merleau-Ponty is more concerned “widi stability [of the body-subject] on 
an hour-by-hour, day-to-day basis” (Crossley 1996: 103).
The body, obviously, is an organism that is related to other bodies, as it is a 
“part”, or an “element” of the physical environment. The mind whereas, contrary to 
the statement of Descartes, is related to the world not directly but rather through its 
particular body, because it is related to one body only. The mind, thus, becomes a 
relatum only because the body is populated in the world with other bodies. It is 
necessary to be corporeal in order to be social, to be ethical, and to be political, or 
more radically, in order to be, in the first place.
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach and views on the body stand at 
the intersection of many other preceding and succeeding major conceptions in which 
the body has played an important role. Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of 
Perception, for instance, speaks of the body as “a work of art” whilst he formulates 
the process of synthesis of one’s own body (1962: 150). His is said to be a Tantric 
approach (Jung 1996: 2). In Tantrism, the body is not something that human being 
has, but human being is its body, and in that respect Merleau-Ponty is echoing 
“Tantric” Nietzsche.
We know that Merleau-Ponty has followed up the rather undeveloped 
notions of Freud where Freud initiates the idea of the importance of the other’s 
body in the formation of self (Gatens 1996: 33). It is only after Merleau-Ponty’s 
accounts on the perception and “the visible and the invisible”; Lacan has developed 
much further his “mirror stage” in its full complexity (Pile 1996: 124n3).
We also know that Merleau-Ponty has used Bergson’s philosophical accounts 
whilst putting forth the body’s interrelatedness with time and space. Husserl’s
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phenomenology, thus, has its full impact with Merleau-Ponty’s contributions, and can 
be claimed that helped significantly to pave the way for Derrida (Grosz 1994: 94) to 
develop deconstruction. His views on the mind that it is necessarily and inevitably 
embodied is close to that of Spinoza’s monistic view. Spinoza states that the mind is 
constituted by the embodiment: reason can be active only by the affirmation of a 
particular body, triggered by the actual existence of that body (cf. Deleuze-and- 
Guattari’s Body).
Merleau-Ponty’s writings on and around the body and embodiment, 
therefore, have a peculiar historical position, for the fact that he has formed a twist 
that binds the mind and the body in a tightly intertwined way; similar to the double 
helix of DNA. He has used and re-theorized what have been said before him, and 
thus formed a cornerstone in the history of conceptions of the relation of the body 
and mind, I believe, the contributions made by Derrida and Deleuze owe a debt to 
Merleau-Ponty and his understandings.
To insert a play as the last word in order to remind the Möbius: If one 
replaces all the “phenomenology”s, written in next page, with “the body” rather than 
“the mind”, fundamentally there seems to be nothing that does not fit to the situation 
of being embodied in the world as human beings.
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1. Phenomenology provided a people centered form of knowledge based in
human awareness, experience, and understanding. Thus, “phenomenology is founded 
upon a conflict tension rather than upon a preestablished harmony” (O’Neill 1989: 
26). Hwa Yol Jung asserts that, as a "'movement, phenomenology is neither a school of 
thought nor a fixed set of dogmas. Its true vitality is preserved and resides in its 
capacity to transform itself’ (1996: 1). Merleau-Ponty himself promotes
phenomenology as a “pure interrogation” and not as a “rigorous science” (Jung 1996: 
2). phenomenology does not search for a fixed truth or a final meaning and
rather instead, it is ready to confront ambiguity and plurality in the very order of 
things in the world. Therefore, phenometiologyip), perhaps, is a “good” way to approach 
to the body, and to understand the approach of a body:
2. The body provided a people centered form of knowledge based in human 
awareness, experience, and understanding. Thus, “the body is founded upon a
conflict tension rather than upon a preestablished harmony” (-----------------). Hwa Yol
Jung asserts that, as a "movement, tho body is neither a school of thought nor a fixed 
set of dogmas. Its true vitality is preserved and resides in its capacity to transform
itself’ (-------). Merleau-Ponty himself promotes the body as a “pure interrogation”
and not as a “rigorous science” (------------). Therefore, the body does not search for a
fixed truth or a final meaning and rather instead, it is ready to confront ambiguity and 
plurality in the very order of things in the world. Therefore, the bo^Q), perhaps, is a 
“good” way to approach to the body, and to understand the approach of a body:
The body is a phenomenon with and without logos. It is what occurs**^ .
16 To occur: 1. to happen; take place; come to pass. 2. to be met with or found; present 
itself; appear: 3. to suggest itself in thought; come to mind (usu. fol. by to). [1520-30; < L 
occurrere to run to meet, arrive, come to mind = oc- OC - + cúrrete to run].
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4 Conclusion: The Möbius Strip with no Closure
i‘
On point, to point out, and to make a point:
We do not have much time, so I will limit myself to some points. I 
will make some points, as you say in the language that remains 
foreign to me and to which I remain foreign. But, in any case, how 
can one make a point? And as I try to say something on the subject 
of the point and the point of the subject, I must also ask something 
of the stranger and the foreigner. What do strange and foreign 
mean?
The first point: At this conference, the point is the subject. 
Traditionally, the point is very determined, marking the one, the 
unity, the identity, the singularity. At tlie same time, however, the 
point is the least determined unity, identity, or singularity, that one 
can represent.
One can present a pomt of view. There is as well a point of 
departure-a point of departure for a line, which is also the point of 
departure for a surface, for a volume, and ultimately for time. . . 
(Derrida 1991: 39-45)
On “book”, closure, and rhizome:
The good writing has therefore always been comprehended. . .  within a 
totality, and enveloped in a volume or in a book. The idea of a book 
is the idea of totality, finite or infinite, of die signifier; tliis totality 
of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by
I believe it is better to give a clue about the tone and style of this conclusion chapter in the 
very beginning of it: Zero does not exist in Roman numerals. It is an Arabic concept. It < 
ML zephirum < Ar sifr CIPHER. Yet, the cipher. Zephyr, is a west wind. Blowing from the 
Romans, the first moderns, toward the Other, the Arabs.
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the signified preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs.
And is independent of it in its ideality. (Derrida 1976: 18)
In nature, roots are taproots witli a more multiple, lateral, and 
circular system of ramification, rather than a dichotomous one. . . .
Even the book as a natural reality is a taproot, with its pivotal spine 
and surrounding leaves. . . . The pivotal taproot provides no better 
understanding of multiplicity than the dichotomous root. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 5)
The book has never comprehended the outside. . . . Write to the «th 
power, the n - \ power, write with slogans: Make rhizomes, not 
roots, never plant! Don’t be one or multiple, be multiplicities! Run 
lines never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, 
even when standing still! . . .  A rhizome has no beginning or end; it 
is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, in tem e^o. The 
tree is filiation but die rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree 
imposes verb “to be,” but fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction,
“and . . . and . . . and” This conjunction carries enough force to 
shake and uproot the verb “to be.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 24-
5)
Therefore, I will run lines, not make a point. I will be quick, yet I will be 
standing still. We do not have much time, and so, contrary to what I have said above, 
I will limit myself to some points. I will not ask, “what is . . The Möbius strip has 
no beginning or end. No closure . We are, now, on the nomad land in our journey 
that is intended for mapping the conceptions of the body and Deleuze has said 
mapping is an experimentation in contact with the real (see Introduction chapter).
Closure is the property of being closed with respect to a particular operation. Closure is the 
tendency to see an entire figure even though the picture of it is incomplete. A sense of 
certainty or completeness: a need for closure. This chapter will not be a conclusion in terms 
of a closure, or a termination of this ‘‘book'*. This conclusion will not be a closure. Yet, it 
will try to be adequate in the sense Spinoza makes: it will try to be affirmative and pregnant 
to expansion giving rise to always greater expression. It will be idiosyncratic moreover 
occasionally schizophrenic.
Ill
What is the point of this study? One might still ask. If the point is taken as 
the “essential” point of the study that would take one to a final destination or to a 
last stop, there is no explicit point as such in this study. This study is about something 
that it does not explicitly discuss. It is about the missing points, about the essential 
supplementarity of the body. This is a journey intended for mapping and a map has 
no conclusion, but marks and remarks. There are always gaps and unexplored 
territories and geometry in a map: not the lakes or mountains but fractals of shores 
and rocks, not the forests but the trees and leaves . The point of a map is also to 
show what we do not have in it, what we do not know. Or in other words what we 
know that we do not know. Therefore, the “point” is not what we have or know, but 
what we do not have or do not know. We have seen in the previous chapters how a 
body is formed either from inside out, or from outside in (actually from both ways). 
We have seen how and by what a body is driven, moved, influenced, or harmed.
Yet, we do not know what a body can do.
We do not have an (or a series of) “understanding” on the body. What I mean 
by “understanding” is neither closure or closed totality, nor merely bodily experience
II
3 The double sensation shows, for Merleau-Ponty, the human body as a ‘‘being of two 
leaves'' (one of which is an object in a world of other objects, the other of which is a 
perceiver of these objects). The flesh, moreover, is composed of the “leaves" of the body 
interspersed with the “leaves" of the world.
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or mental comprehension, but an “adequate"* state” of the interrelated ontological, 
epistemological, and phenomenological realms (since the world has been virtually 
divided into realms as such), which can help us to “locate, connect, and relate” 
ourselves as embodied beings in and to this world here. This is necessary before we 
strive to relate and then connect ourselves to transcendental otherworldly realms as 
we feel the urge of believing that we will be located in there eventually. A rhizomatic 
“understanding of the body” can replace the so-deeply-rooted negation of this world 
and the body in favour of the promised heaven and the eternal soul (mind). Such an 
understanding will be ethical and political as they are first and foremost worldly, 
corporeal, intercorporeal. Ethical and political are for the future and from the past (as 
they have always already been occurring in the “present” time^). Ethical and political 
are about circumstances and possibilities as “we” are living not “alone” (in both of 
the senses; not as an isolated mind deprived of the body, and not as an individual 
independent from the social) but among and in-between what constitutes “us” (in 
both of the senses; among and in-between the mind and the body as much as the self 
and the other, it is the multiplicity that constitutes “us”). The other and the body are
See Hardt 1993, esp. the chapter on Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze. For Spinoza, adequate 
is neither supplies satisfaction nor it is static, it is not linearly progressive, it is pregnant. It is 
the transformation of tlie epistemological toward the ethical. “Adequacy is infectious, giving 
rise to always greater expression . . . Just like an adequate action of the mind, an adequate 
action of the body is expressive in that it explains or envelops its cause. The adequate is that 
which discloses the productive dynamic of being” (90-1). So, adequate is expansion, 
expansion to cover the other.
 ^See Zeno’s paradox below for the impossibility of the “present” time, but as Derrida states 
the present time can be conceivable only insofar as every instant is marked with the traces of 
past and future. It is a product of the relations between past and future
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both the product and the creator of circumstances and possibilities . Circumstances 
and possibilities are, again, as they are “present”, from the past and for the future. 
Circumstances are the state of affairs surrounding and affecting “us” (the other and 
the body). And we do not know a body’s power to be affected. Possibilities are what 
may or can exist, happen, and may or can be done, be used by “us” (the other and the 
body). And we do not know what a body can do. Therefore, I am not asking, “what is 
the body?”, but trying to embark a rhizomatic journey toward an adequate 
“understanding”, that would only occur by asking “what a body may or can do?” 
What the body is able to do to/for “us” (for the other)? We do not know.
Ill
We do not know what a body can do. We do not have a history of affections, 
senses, sensations, feelings. We do not have a model of practice, a map of bodily 
techniques, encounters, relations, connections. We do not have a practical means to 
reconcile the accumulated experiences and knowledges on the body acquired in 
practice and theory, which until now have remained “clearly” distinct. Cartesianism 
should supply an adequate answer to the question: How can “clearly” distinct realms 
establish connections, when they encounter, if they do encounter at all? We do not 
have adequate means to guide us in the complexity of encountering of two and more 
bodies. We do not have a technique neither for affirming and enriching the
I would like to give credit to my supervisor. Prof. Mutman, for being the source of my 
awareness of this fact as he raised the issue of the “other” in a very inspirational fashion (in 
terms of my purposes) during his speech he delivered on May 1, 1998, at Architects 
Association, Ankara.
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compatibility of encountering bodies, nor for overcoming the conflicts of the 
encounter. It has been said that we also do not have a coherent theory of the body 
that would address the huge range of problems relating to the issue of being 
embodied and the body. I do not believe we can ever achieve such a theory, insofar as 
what is meant by that is only another metaphysical view on, stare at the body from a 
transcendental position “high in the sky”. I also do not believe that we need such a 
“theory”. What we need is physical, not metaphysical, tactile not visual, worldly not 
otherworldly. What we need is the ethical and political possibilities of techniques, 
paths, and connections for the ceaseless activities of the body. The body is active and 
affirmative, it establishes alliances. It makes the world firm enough to stand on . Its 
existence is the affirmation of the world, the life, the other; its existence is alliance 
with the world, the life, the other. Yet, the affirmative body is not self-reflexive, as the 
mind supposedly is. The mind is, as it is said, alone, hence it is monologic, it has to 
rely on (cogitó) “itse lf , hence it is split (in order to turn on itself). It is schizophrenic, 
yet it does not admit it. The body is indelibly dialogic; thus it is not merely a 
substance, but a relatum. If one should make a comparison, it is the mind that sleeps, 
not the body. The body is continually aware, yet not self-aware as it is oriented 
outside, to others seeking for dialogue, for connection. It is too close to “us”. Too 
close to perceive. Too close that it is forgotten. The body is like air and water, too 
ordinary, too common, too near that; it escapes from our attention. It is only with its 
embodiment (the inseparability of mind and body, of both being a subject and an 
object) the human being can be an element in this world: perhaps, the fifth element.
See the below for the etymological toots of “to stand”, and its relation “to exist”, “to
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The body is not an object among others. The body is not “belong” to a subject either. 
Embodied human being says “I am my body”, not “I have a body” as the possessive, 
epicentric, and lonely mind says “to itself’. There is already enough discreet potential 
of becoming in the body, in its power to be affected. We do not know what a body 
can do.
IV
In this study the Möbius strip is employed in three different metaphorical 
fashion in spite of the fact that it has apparent limitations -however, any metaphor 
would have.
First use is about the deconstruction of the dichotomous thought, in order 
to illustrate the illusory act of bisecting a unified, closed whole into clearly distinct 
pairs with hegemonic and subordinated poles of the dualism. The undecidability of 
the continually oscillating one-and-two surface(s) (twone) of the Möbius strip is 
considered as having visual qualities that help one in understanding the 
deconstructionist tools such as, essential supplementarity, trace, differance. 
Obviously, by employing the deconstructionist tools into certain (phonocentric and 
ethnocentric) discourses that relies on logos as its epicentre, Derrida has thereupon 
shattered the mind and body opposition among others derived from it. One point is 
worth to mention here; the opposition of writing and speech actually had not 
preceded the mind and body dichotomy, although it later has functioned catalytically 
for its propagation. As Derrida says:
understand”.
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Writing, the letter, die sensible inscription, has always been 
considered by Western tradition as the body and matter external to 
spirit, to breadi, to speech, and to the logos . . . .  [yet] the problem 
of body and soul is no doubt derived from die problem of writing 
from which it seems to borrow its metaphors. (1976: 35)
The problem widi the dichotomous thought actually is not an inherent 
problem of the pair, of the two. It is not the dominance of the pair, but only of one 
of them makes it problematic. The one wants to act as the primary term always all the 
time. It does not let the other to establish a dialogue and does not tolerate the other 
to become the one. The one wants to retain its oneness  ^ thus always strive to draw clean 
boundaries around itself Therefore it does not matter how many would be excluded, 
it does not have to be another one or a cluster of them. As long as there is one and 
the other side (only the other one or many ones) the dichotomy is established. 
Therefore, to introduce a third term would not solve the dichotomy. That is why a 
closed (regular) strip can exemplify the dichotomous thought (one line on one side, 
one or many on the other side) and the Möbius strip can constitute a good example 
for the nondichotomous thought (any line that is drawn on “one side” has to cover 
the “other side” as it proceeds, and it has to proceed to be a line -o f  thought, action, 
etc.).
Second use of the Möbius metaphor is about the two broadly, yet not 
distinctly, grouped conceptions of the body, which are named as, for analytical and 
practical purposes, the lived-body model and the inscribed-body model. The lived- 
body model fosters the primacy of the “interiority” as the body in the first place 
must be psychically constituted, represented, and lived in order for the subject 
acquire a sense of selfhood, and thus can relate itself to the world, to the others. The
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inscribed-body model, on the otlier hand, emphasizes the “exteriority” as the body is 
the site of the subject’s social production. Throughout the study the I have tried to 
show that the views in the two approaches are not developed as to oppose to each 
other. Obviously, as none of the figures I have presented has a primary goal of 
developing a coherent theory of the body, and consequently they are rather using the 
body in order to exemplify their assertions. Their contexts as well as their priorities 
may differ significantly. Yet, one common point is that they all have rejected the 
predetermined hegemonic relation of the binary oppositions and somehow 
contributed to the development of the conception of embodiment as a reconciliation 
and interrelatedness of the mind and body, yet in varying degree and emphasis. That 
is an affinity already strong enough to consider them as sharing the same “grounds” 
and hence exhibiting not seriously opposed but diverse views. Nietzsche, for instance, 
primarily critiques the idealized (idolized) values of the modernity: the metaphysically 
magnified conceptions of reason, mind, truth, and consciousness. For him, these are 
the sources of the reactive forces that are emanated from social inhibitions on the 
body which itself and its inherent forces have long been forgotten. He is for a more 
balanced epistemology: the reconciliation of the mind and the body (embodiment). 
Foucault, in the same fashion has primarily tried to show the emergence of the 
power/knowledge relations -in a transition period of the western society (from 
traditional to modern)— which are used as a control mechanism and he demonstrate 
effects of this process on both the physical body and the bodily desires. Deleuze and 
Guattari has emphasized a deep respect for all the objects in the world and, similarly 
to the figures mentioned above, they have investigated the rules and forces that 
effects the relations, connections. They have tried to show the place of the subject, of 
the human being among other objects by asserting the ontological sameness, which
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may have influences in the ethical and political realm. The body as it is recklessly 
structured and shaped by the State and the system is the token for them in showing 
the primacy of (ethical, political) action, and the indelibility, inevitability of the 
relations and connections with others. For Freud, the body is the foundation for the 
ego formation, for the formation of the self. The body and the subject are always in 
relation, for him, and this happens particularly as the subject’s libido is invested on 
the body and its parts, and as the image of the body shapes the ego. The body, for 
Freud, is the means of communication of the otherwise incommunicable psyche. 
Similarly, Lacan’s account on the body is primarily focused on its role in the process 
of ego formation. The body’s image that the infant encounters constitutes the first 
other that caused the realm, she has been living in, to split and fracture, from which 
the realization of the ego stems. Facets of the embodiment such as gaze and voice, 
which can not be mirrored and symbolized, produces the eternal lack the subject 
seeks for throughout her life. In Merleau-Ponty’s case the body is put forth as a 
phenomenon which can only be experienced and lived by the embodied subject. The 
body is an in-between medium that is both an object (for others), and a lived reality 
(for the subject). The environment provides a medium on which the subject can 
reflect upon itself. The body is active and capable of authoring the world; it generates 
meaning and knowledge by positioning itself among other objects and by establishing 
relations with them. This body has to be ethical and political. The Möbius strip 
metaphor takes effect when one considers the starting point of the views 
summarized above: they meet at the crucial twist of the strip. At the inversion point. 
Yet, in the final analysis, all of these views above take the body as the “essential” tie 
to this world, to others, and to us: they start from the opposite sides, however they
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eventually meet, or cover the same ground (the body that is formed, shaped, and 
driven) as there is no opposite side in a Möbius strip.
VI
Thirdly, the metaphor of tlie Möbius strip is used within the structuration of 
the study. We started from the Descartes where we think we are the only one (line in 
the regular strip). Derrida has pointed out the crucial inversion, the twist of the strip 
where the strip is realized as having a continuous one surface. Then we proceed to 
draw a line from a certain point in the strip (the body from within outside), passed 
through the twist and joined another point in the way (the body from within inside), 
and by completing the cycle we are here (the Möbius strip with no closure). 
Obviously the strip has accomplished its mission as a metaphor now. Yet, there may 
be one more step (or rather leap) to go in order to complete the experimentation 
with this metaphor. That is a journey, a schizophrenic one that would take place at 
the brims of the strip, leaping from one to other brim imminently.
This work can be considered as completed here with this point. The rational, 
self-reflexive, formally and officially correct part is terminated here. The next section 
is what can be considered as a highly idiosyncratic, schizophrenic journey, it may be 
skipped. (To remind the metaphor of the Möbius strip the last sentence must be the 
first one). Thus after all. The body is the keyword.
6 Deleuze and Guattari says (about reading Capitalism and Schizophrenia) that you read it as 
you would listen to a record. “You don’t approach a record as a closed book that you have to 
take or leave. There are always cuts that leave you cold. So you skip them” (Massumi 1996:
7)·
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VII
At the same time, the point is so undetermined, so anonymous, so 
unnarnable, that it lends itself immediately to substitution- even 
sacrificial substitution. A point-en vaut un autre, I would say in 
French-is equivalent to another, is exchangable [sic] for another, and 
is worth another. Likewise, the subject, the self, the signature, and 
man, to the extent that they are representable by points, are at one 
and the same time calculable and replaceable, determined and 
undetermined. As such, each defines a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition of the access of tlie individual (the individual 
as indivisible resembles a point) to law, to rights, to equality, to 
electoral democracy, to parliamentary regimes, to individual 
property, and, therefore, to capitalism. II faut du point-one of all 
these institutions. First, tliat the point is indivisible and, therefore, 
does not relate to itself, the relation to self (without which there is 
no self) supposing internal difference- fold, reflection, division-even 
if it is notself-consciousness. This implies, then, that a point can be 
one but on the condition of not being a self (selfsame).
Second, to the extent that it remains absolutely undetermined in its 
determination, the point has no singularity, no simple unicity. It is 
replaceable; it cannot constitute a signature, even less a work or an 
event. It cannot have a proper name. And what is true of the point 
is true of a multiplicity of points, of ones as points. (Derrida 1991:
39-45)
Descartes’s epistemocracy -his epistemological regime of philosophy- has
not been limited to only western philosophy, but dispersed to dominate all the
epistemological formulations and processes. The modern legacy of Cartesian regime
of epistemology exhibits itself with disembodiment, and egocentricity. Qung 1996).
Under the name of humanism the privileged atomic individual has been overrated as
being the center of the universe as a conscious agency furnished by unequivocal self-
knowledge (Pile 1995). Christianity has contributed largely for the body to be
regarded as an ephemeral and perishable commodity in favour of incorporeal
immortality (Turner 1996). The mind has been detached from the body, and exalted
to a transcendental position rather than taken as an immanent aspect of the human
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embodiment. The Cartesian cogito is inherently egocentric, because it is the act of the 
mind as the “thinking substance” {res cogitan^ which always and necessarily says, “I 
think” {ego cogitó). The “thinking substance” (mind) does not need the body {res 
extensa: exterior substance) for its existence, it is isolated and disembodied; it does not 
need an exteriority. Yet, the word ex/istence {ex-: out, sister, stand) discloses that it is 
in effect the “eccentricity” (ex-: out, centrum: stick) of the self toward the others, and 
not the centrality of it that “agitates” the cogito {co-,agitare: to drive). Cartesian theory 
{theoria: observing, looking at), within an hegemonic hierarchy of structuration, has 
bisected the world into clearly distinct realms of subjectus {g,\óc>-jacere: to throw or 
place beneath), and objectus {oh-Jacaré·, to throw against or put before). The subjectus is 
hidden beneath in the beginning, until it is hit by the objectus:
What is thrown, placed beneath the earth (subject) in isolation, needs to be 
agitated, driven (cogito) by the sticks of other’s (its own eccentricity) that they throw 
from outside (objects, or other subjects), for it to stand on the earth (exist) and to 
observe (theorize)^.
This “stick of other’s” that is mutually thrown continuously is what makes 
the difference possible. The difference is at the ambiguous “double sensation” of the 
“flesh” (of Merleau-Ponty), is what the “struggle” between “active and reactive
The subjectus is sub-^a«ri: to throw or place beneath. Beneath: bef. 900; ME benethe, OE 
beneothan = be- BE - + neothan, below, akin to OHG nidana. See NETHER. Nether: lying 
or believed to lie beneath the earth's surface; infernal.
12 2
fo rces'’ produces (o f Nietzsche), is w here the ‘‘zone o f  indiscernibility" is p rop er to
‘becoming" (of Deleuze and Guattari) 10
It is not only the difference made possible by the “stick of other’s" that give 
birth to the subject, but it is the difference of the absence {ab-esse: to be away), and 
presence {pm-esse\ to be), also. Absence is just a javelin’s {oh-Jacarey suh-Jacare) throw 
away from the presence^^ The javelin, the stick {centruni) is not fixed to the ground. 
“In the smooth space of Zen, the arrow does not go from one point to another but 
is taken up at any point, to be sent to any other point, and tends to permute with the 
archer and the target” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 377) . Difference (etymologically 
as well) implies to carry, to hold, to support, to bear, and to give birth. Difference is 
not, and can not be a negative term; difference actually is not what isolates, but what 
connects, ties, bounds, and establishes relations. Difference, actually in the beginning, 
was already same with Derrida’s differance : d^ \-pherein\ to bear, to carry, to hold. Yet,
10
11
Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 448.
Zeno’s paradox of the flight of an arrow. Its motion is never present at any moment of 
presence. Derrida says “think the present starting from/in relation to time as difference, 
differing, and deferral." See Culler 1987: 89-110.
12 They also write, contra to the “smooth space of Zen'': “A ‘method' is the striated space of 
the cogitatio universalis and draws a path that must be followed from one point to another. But 
the form of exteriority situates thought in a smooth space that it must occupy without 
counting, and for which there is no possible method, no conceivable reproduction, but only 
relays, intermezzos, resurgences. Thought is like the Vampire; it has no image either to 
constitute a model of or to copy. In the smooth space of Zen . . ." (1987: 377).
13 . .Derrida writes on differance in Positions : “ the systematic play of differences, of the traces 
of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This 
spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of differance indicates this indecision as 
concerns activity and passivity, that which can not be governed by or distributed between the 
terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the ‘full' terms would 
not signify, would not function" (1981 :27).
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difference also defers; delays and carries away, but it, too, holds and bears. Difference 
is what refers {tt-pherein: to bring back), what makes reference possible:
What is away (absent), what is carried away (by difference) is always brought
back (by reference) in order to drive tliought (cogito) to be (presence) itself*"*.
The ‘schizophrenia’ Deleuze and Guattari embrace is not a 
pathological condition . . . Schizophrenia as a positive process is 
inventive connection, expansion ratlier than withdrawal. Its twoness 
is a relay to multiplicity. From one to another (and another . . .). 
From one noun or book or author to another (and another . . .). 
Not aimlessly. Experimentally.*^
*"* Derrida says, “without the possibility of difference, the desire of presence as such would 
not find its breathing-space. That means by the same token that this desire carries in itself 
the destiny of its non-satisfaction. Differance produces what it forbids, makes possible the 
very thing that it makes impossible” (1976: 143).
*^  Massumi 1996: 1, also see schizoanalysis in Deleuze and Guattari 1987. This schizophrenic 
movement also suits this thesis, particularly this chapter, and certainly this section.
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